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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to make an investigation 
into the nature of a type of recent legislation affecting 
public utility labor. The legislation, whioh is relatively 
new, has one outstanding characteristic: the prohibition
of strikes. An apparent reaction to post World War II service 
stoppages, the legislation is an attempt to provide continuity 
of public utility services by regulating labor relations.
Information about this type of legislation is limited. 
There have been no books published about these laws, although 
the statutes themselves are available in the statute books of 
the various states having this type of laws. Since the Law 
Library at Montana State University does not have the more 
recent statute books, it was necessary to send away for the 
statutes. In addition, there is a scarcity of artioles con­
cerning these laws and their application.
The main source of Information, aside from the statutes 
themselves, has been the magazine, the Publlo Utilities 
Fortnightly, published by Public Utility Reports, Inc., 
Washington, D. C. This source furnished most of the back­
ground material as well as short artioles that were in the 
nature of reports on public utility labor legislation. In 
order to ascertain the opinion and effeots of this type of
2
legislation# questionnaires were sent to a selected list of 
organizations and persons. Dr. Lois MacDonald's reoent book­
let# Compulsory Arbitration in New Jersey# gave much infor­
mation of a specialized nature.
The paper is divided into eight chapters. Chapter I# 
the introduction# gives some idea of the scope and purpose 
of the paper. Chapter II defines and outlines the charac­
teristics of a public utility. Chapter III introduces the • 
problem of continuity of service and gives some idea of how 
the problem arose. Chapter IV sets down the possible ways 
to approach the problem and gives some background of each 
approach. Chapter V# the main body of the thesis, is con­
cerned with anti-strike legislation. The statutes are out­
lined and discussed and the type of legislation described in 
detail. Chapter VI records the application of the legisla­
tion with special note being taken of the court action that 
has arisen from the use of these laws. Chapter VII gives 
some idea of the effects of the legislation on the public# 
labor and management# utilizing the results of the question­
naires. Chapter VIII is an evaluation of the legislation,
pointing out some of the weaknesses and flaws of the statutes
«
and a preliminary conclusion as to the value of the
r
legislation.
CHAPTER II
DEFINITION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
That kind of economic enterprise called a 1 public 
utility* is a strange and peculiar institution within our 
eoonomlc system. The term "public utility* is,difficult 
to define for it carries with It no self-explanatory 
definition.The.only thing that is common to all public 
utilities is that all hare been declared by our courts to be 
•affected with the publio interest*.
"Affected with the publio interest8 is a purely legal 
concept that has grown up With our courts, the final arbi­
trator of such questions being the Supreme Court of the 
United States. Because the concept is legal and has a 
tendency to be broadened or restricted as the thoughts of 
the courts change, a publio utility, for the purpose of this 
paper, will be defined in terms of Industries. That is, 
those industries that produce, distribute and sell heat,
i . *
electric light and power, gas, water, communications and 
transportation (excluding interstate carrierswill be 
considered publio utilities.
“ 1 Emery Troxel, Economics of Public Utilities, (New
fork: Rhinehart and Company,, Inc. » 1941?), p. 3.
2 Interstate carriers are very broad in scop© and have 
been regulated by the federal government for many years.
Since this paper is primarily concerned with state regulation, interstate carriers will not be considered here.
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Beoause publio utilities are declared to be "affected 
with the publio interest", they are regulated by our state, 
federal, and occasionally, local governments. Among other 
things, they are regulated as to service, as to earnings, 
as to oharges they may make for their product and as to com­
petition in serving certain sections of any locality. Regu­
lation, therefore, is a natural oonsequence of the legal 
declaration of a publio utility.
The two dominant characteristics of this legally 
declared and regulated type of enterprise, the public utility, 
are "natural monopoly" and essential products, with certain 
distinct demand features.3
First, it is doubtful that there is such a thing as 
a "natural* monopoly in the sense that monopoly is the 
product of nature or that it is natural to our economic 
system. Nevertheless, It is one of the determining factors 
in the question of why an industry is "affected with the 
publio interest*.
The type of industry that tends "naturally*, toward 
monopoly is characterized by high fixed costs and increasing 
returns which combine in suoh a way as to limit naturally 
the number of firms in a given field.
"High fixed costs* includes the costs of procuring
3 The following sections, discussing the character­istics of publio utilities, are based on Emery Troxel, 
Economics of Publio Utilities, op. eft., pp. 8-12.
necessary equipment and capital of either a fixed or 
specialized variety. An example would be the investment In 
specialized equipment of the production plant and distribu­
tion lines of the electric power industry. This neoessity 
of heavy fixed cost type of investment in original plant 
tends to limit the number of firms that can profitably enter 
this field.
The characteristic of ^increasing returns# Is aotually 
a result of large fixed costs.' That is# beoause of the large 
fixed cost investment# any additional return in the form of 
income means a greater return on the investments Since the 
fixed costs on the investment continue whether the utility 
is producing a large or a small amount of the produot, any 
income from the sale of additional product will mean that the 
fixed oosts per unit of product will be smaller beoause they 
have been spread over a greater amount of output. Therefore# 
after a certain point has been reached, each addition to 
output will reduce the fixed oosts per unit of output and 
the result will be that the addition in output returns a 
larger and larger return on investment.
Increasing returns tends to promote what is known as 
wcut-thrOat# competition. Beoause of the neoessity of 
covering the high fixed oosts and beoause each addition to 
output will make for more return, competition may become 
disastrous in its effects on these industries.
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During this highly competitive situation, the object 
of the producer is Inoreased income fro® increased output.
The rates or prices of servioe are cut by the produoer in an 
attempt to increase his share of the market.. Retaliatory 
outs follow. Eventually the price of the service sold falls 
below the oosts of production. However, as long as the price 
covers the variable costs and applies some revenue to fixed 
oosts, production will oontlnue. Hie outoome of this type 
of competition is that one of the competing firms loses out 
and is foroed to sell its Interests to the remaining firm or 
leave the market.
Before this type of competition oomes about, two 
events take place that are considered socially undesirable 
by publio utility economists. First, a duplicate plant must
be established. A large Investment is made in duplicating
* ' ' «
facilities and muoh capital and labor are wasted. This 
duplication is definitely an eoonomio waste unless it improves 
the produot offered in some way. It Is generally felt, how­
ever, that the produot is rarely improved in suoh a situation.
Second, servloe may suffer. The duplication tends 
toward poorer service because the customer is required to 
install duplicate sets of equipment in order to get full and 
effioient service. This ie true only for telephone communi­
cation where it would be necessary to have duplicate receiv­
ing sets in order to obtain adequate service.
7
tsk addition, during the active competitive period, 
the service will suffer beoause the prioe of the service is 
being cut to the point where the income received Just covers 
variable costs. As a consequence, repairs to equipment and
oapital as well as maintenance of customer services cannot
\
properly be provided. This is true for all the publio 
utilities.
fheoretieaily, the eventual outcome of ttcut-throat® 
oompebitiou is that one of the competing firms forces the 
other out of business, fhi# leaves the remaining firm in a 
monopoly position.
Actually, price agreement between the two competing 
firms is more likely to take place. Unless such agreement 
is prevented by regulatory commissions, a duopoly results, 
this leaves both firms in a monopolistic position.
Second, the products of a public utility are services 
and have oertaiii characteristics that set them apart from 
those of other industries; they are non-storable and are 
essential*
Because the products of utilities are services, they; 
cannot be stored. On the other hand, the raw materials used 
to produce the services may be stored, that is, the coal to 
turn steam turbines or manufacture gas, the water to turn 
hydro—electric generators or to provide Water in the water 
mains, and the diesel oil to run buses all may be stored#
8
Yet it Is impossible for the utility to produce the terries 
itself for inventory, the services are perishable and oust 
be used up as they are produced.
This tends to complicate the production of utility 
service because the production plant mist be eonstruoted and 
maintained so that it will be prepared to meet the greatest 
demand that oeuld possibly be plaoed upon it. That is* the 
plant nust be able to serve the *peafc load* or maxima* 
demand that eould conceivably oome about. Therefore* ezeess 
plant must be built and maintained even though it is used 
only on rare ooeasions. The rates for the servioe must be 
so arranged that this necessary ezeess is paid for even though 
it is not used.
Here important* the servloes of a utility are consid­
ered to be socially essential to the welfare of the people. 
Great Inconvenience results when the servioe is not available. 
Continuous servioe* therefore* is required of all publio 
utilities.
In addition to the faotors of essentiality and non- 
storability, the products have certain distinctive demand 
faotors. Generally the demand for the servloes of a publio 
utility is relatively stable* when compared to other 
industries* This stability of demand* coupled with the 
peculiar characteristic of inoome Inelasticity of demand* 
results in steadiness of inoome over a given period of time.
Inelasticity of income demand means that as the 
inoome of the consumer's of these services Increases or 
•decreases, the.amount of servioe also Increases m ■ decreases 
hut not in the same proportion as the change in .income.
That is, a 10 per cent. increase or decrease in Income of a 
consumer mill not cause a 10 per cent increase or decrease 
in the consumption of the poser# m  &n example, father#, it 
trill cause a less than 10 per cent increase or decrease.
This is merely another way of stating Sngelg1 second law of 
income.4
The significance of Inelasticity of income demand is 
that the income of the utility remains fairly constant oyer 
& ■ given period of time even if great changes in economic 
conditions of the users or the economic conditions of the 
country as a whole tahes place.
Therefor©,, public utilities are businesses vested 
with the public interest. That is, because of their peculiar 
position in the economy, they ay© considered %ff©ot©d with 
the public interest1* and are subject to governmental 
regulation."
Regulation of utilities by governments has many 
aspects. A full discussion of governmental regulation of 
utilities will not be given here. Rather, this paper will
4.:idEarles S. Wyand, Tbonomios of Consumption, (flaw fork: The Macmillan Company, p. 219. "
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be limited to one aspect of regulation, namely, regulation 
of service.
Within the scope of regulation of servioe are suoh 
mattora as attentions and abandonments, type and quality of 
service, interconnections, discriminatory actions and con­
tinuity of servioe, among others. As indicated in the title, 
this paper will be concerned with one facet of .service 
regulation; the problem of continuity of service.
CHAPTER H I  
THE PROBLEM OF OOHTXKUE9 SERVICE
Beoause'of the essentiality of the cervio© rendered 
by publio utilities, it has been reoognlzed for some time 
that the utilities have a responsibility to hold themselves 
out to serve all who demand their produot. This responsi­
bility of ^holding out to serve0 has been an integral part 
of our regulatory policy in the past.
In past years# It was usually the utility itself that 
was guilty of violating this responsibility of servioe. 
Within recent years, this responsibility of service has been 
threatened by a now force, namely, the stoppage of servioe 
due to strikes or other weapons of Industrial warfare. This 
new force has given rise to a new servioe problem, on© that 
concerns the health and welfare of the nation.
In the past there have been few strikes in the publio 
servloes. Where strikes have occurred, suoh as the Boston 
Folio© Strik© of 1919, they have merely served to emphasize 
the contention that the right to strike against agencies 
providing essentia! services is doubtful. These Infrequent 
strikes of the past seem to Hhave brought nothing but chaos 
to the Innocent victims who bear the oosts, the public”
1 Waiter E. Edge, wLabor-Hanageraent Relations in Public Utilities,” Public Utilities Fortnightly, 38:70,
July 18, 1946.
12
Between 1919 and 1946 strikes In the utility Industry 
rarely occurred. There had been numerous threats of strikes 
hut the Implications of stoppage of utility servioe were 
considered to he so Intensely anti-soolal .that.all parties 
to disputes had always been induced to make some peaceful 
settlement of their differences so .that the strikes never 
materialized. This was especially true in the eleotrio. 
power industry where strikes were practically "taboo8.̂
Shortly following World War II the country was faoed 
with a series of strikes In the telephone Industry, the 
power Industry and the transportation Industry. The reasons 
for these strikes varied widely. It was a period of general 
Industrial unrest. Individual workers were tired and many 
were financially able to take time off. Wartime restrictions 
had taxed their physical resources and hampered their tradi­
tional means of settling grievances. During the eaergenoy, 
management had been willing to ooncedeto the demands of 
labor beoause public opinion was against work stoppages.
The post-war efforts of the government to maintain price 
ceilings collided with union attempts to maintain wartime 
wage levels by boosting pay. But perhaps more important, 
both labor and management had forgotten much of the art of
“"i 2 Pittsburgh Looks to Lewis," Business Week, p. 104,October 12, 1946. However, immediately following T^orld War I, 
there were several strikes in the power industry - Joseph C. McIntosh, "Shall We Arbitrate*8 Public Utilities Fortnightly, 39:80, January 16, 1947.
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collective bargaining.
In addition, soolety bad given labor Ita protection,
If not its blessing, in the Wagner Act passed by Congress In 
1935. Following its passage, organized labor has tripled In 
numbers and raised its effectiveness in bargaining strength. 
Wartime restrictions bad held back this power. The end of 
hostilities, coupled with the general unrest of the times, 
called forth this potential force.3
In rapid succession during the month of February 1946, 
strikes in industries providing essential services to the 
public were called in Hew York, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh.
It has been estimated that the lives of 12,500,000 persons 
in these cities were disrupted by these three strikes 
involving 16,500 union members.^
New York City was completely paralyzed for eighteen 
hours on February 18th, and Mayor 0*Bwyer ordered the world1s 
largest metropolis shut down. Barge-borne supplies of fuel 
oil, coal and coke were dwindling dangerously as the American 
Federation of Labor crews of the tugboats walked out. New 
Yorkers learned quickly that their city, surrounded by rivers, 
was dependent on barge-drawn supplies of fuel to keep life
3 Publio Servioe Strikes,* Fortune, 32M14, November1945.
4 wLooal strikes throttle trade, Ordeal in three cities,* Business Week, p. 16, February 16, 1946.
fa tit© metropolis moving at high speed.5
M l  business except that involving the publio health 
and safety was suspended by the New York municipal government. 
Subway servioe was curtailed, causing thousands of commuters 
to spend endless hours in. Grand Central and Pennsylvania 
stations. Grcwds .gathered in front of closed stores* eleva­
tor service was suspended, and business came to » complete 
h a l t . 6  ■
, During the same west in February, Philadelphia was in 
the.midst of a. transit strike. for forty-eight hoars ‘transit 
system operators and maintenance men completely crippled the 
City*© transportation service. M l  trolleys, buses, subways 
and elevated trains were stopped. 4s cars moved bumper to 
busier and car pools were formed, Philadelphia learned that 
there wa? no easy substitute for a service that normally 
carried 3,000,000 riders a day.?
But more drastic in its results than the New fork and 
Philadelphia strikes was the power stoppage in Pittsburg 
where 3,500 employees of the Duqueene Fewer Company walked 
off the 10b. for nineteen hours most of Pittsburgh was 
without lights. Supervisory employees generated enough
' 5 <fQisaster/t Time, 47J20, February 25, 1943.
6! alocal strikes . , .,* loo, eft.
7 ©aster,* loo. ©it.
power for emergency uses only. Two> million residents of the 
immediate area were affected. Elevator service ceased* 
business was suspended, and emergency crew® stood by In 
Children1 s hospital, to operate an Iron lung should the power 
cease completely. Even automobile traffic was affected 
because the huge fane that ventilated the Liberty tubes were 
power driven.9
Later in 1946, the independent union at Buquesne Power 
struck again, fa late September the power wag again stopped, 
the strike lasted for four weeks with commercial and indus­
trial life practically closed down. One hundred thousand 
workers were laid off as all but two of 131 companies in one 
industrial association reported that they were forced to 
cease business, the loss in business and payrolls was 
estimated at #15>000,000 a day.9
f -
the inconvenience of this twenty-eight day strike was 
terrific, time magazine give® this description of conditions 
during' the fourih week of the strikei
Pittsburgh*® downtown Golden triangle*1 was festooned with big smoke-gushing boilers, supply­ing heat to office buildings. Motors chugged in the streets to turn power generators for limits.Railroad locomotives fed steam into three large tracksIde buildings. Hundreds of businesses were closed; about 50,000 people were still out of work.
"S ̂ Loeai Strikes . . loo. ■ eit,
9 "batons Power to Cripple a City,H 0. S. Hew a &
World Report, 21:3*?, Cetober 11, 1946. ~ ~ ~ ~
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Pittsburghers hitohhlked to work, waited In line for elevators or skipped up and down stairs, brought their lunoh (few restaurants were open), shivered through a shortened work day, then bummed rides home at n i g h t . '
For eighteen days of the four week strike, the 
Duquesne Power Union, an independent, was supported by 
several other affiliated unions In the olty. This support 
merely added to the inoonvenlenoe of the power shut-off.
, i
The union was•demanding a 20 per cent wage Increase 
and thirty-one other demands, including a share in company 
profits. Settlement finally came when the union accepted 
the company*s repeated offer of arbitration only after being 
warned by United States Secretary of Labor Schellenbaoh to 
accept arbitration before the government took steps to settle 
the s t r i k e . ■
After the Duquesne Power strikes, several others 
followed and many were threatened. By this time the publio 
had begun to realise more than ever before the essential 
nature of these servloes. Inconvenience and suffering had 
served to impress upon the Amerloan people how greatly their
i
lives and industry depended on the efforts of publio utility 
workers and the servloes produced. It was not long until a 
reaction took place.
Attempts to avert more strikes and stoppages of
10 *Ghoat Town,8 Time, £8:25, October 28» 1946.
> /
11 Loo. o It.
1?
service were begun at the 1946 annual Governors* Conference 
which adopted a resolution urging Congress and each, state 
legislature #to enact legislation which will require capital 
and labor to maintain the uninterrupted servioe of utilities 
essential to the life and health of the people”.
After the record Duquesne Power strike late In 1946, 
labor and management began to propose solutions to the problem 
of oontinued servioe. Three states, New.Jersey, Virginia and 
Indiana, enacted legislation prohibiting strikes. And, when
t ' •
the nation*a telephones were tied up early in 1947, proposals 
to prevent discontinuance of service because "of strikes came 
from many additional sources. Legislative committees ..began
to work out solutions, artioles appeared in trade and popular/ ■ ■
magazines, and students of labor relations began to propose 
methods of dealing with the problem of continuity of servioe.13
12 Bethune Jones, ttState Laws on Utility Strikes,” Publio Utilities Fortnightly, 39:54, January 2, 1947.
13 "State Rights? Curb on strikes in public utili­
ties, " Business Week, April 6,- 1946, p. 98; “Public favors law to prohibit utility strikes,” Iron Age, 157:109, April25, 1946; L. H. Hill, “Should strilei”inthe electric 
utilities be outlawed?” Electrical World, 126:68-9, October26, 1946; Joseph C. MeInto5H7"ff§EalT"f^Arbitrate? ** Publio Utilities Fortnightly, 39:80-84, January 16, 1947; Rosooe 
Ames," ̂ Bhoul3~btate Commissions Regulate Utility Labor Relations?9 Public Utilities Fortnightly, 39:352-6, March 31, 1947; H. f i r .  Dorau, bRegulatory Licensing to curb utility strikes," Bus Transportation, 26:37-52, March 1947; “labor •Magna Charts• Released— The Sllchter Report,” Publio Utilities Fortnightly, 39:518, April 10, 1947; Rosooe Ames, 
n\o strikes for utilities, A review of the report of the labor committee of the Twentieth Century Fund," Publio Utilities Fortnightly, 39:687-91, May 22, 1947.
1 8
A good example of the legislative attitude towards 
the necessity of continued service Is contained in the 
report of the Virginia Advisory Legislative Council whioh 
stated In 1947 that:
In the field of publio servioe, it Is unthinkable that the people of any community might be deprived • of the eleotrio* current whioh limits their homes, powers their furnaces, refrigerates and oooks their food, because of a dispute between employees and . employers, regardless of which Is in the wrong.The people also should not be deprived of telephone and transportation services upon whioh the highly integrated society of today depends . .
The public was now awake to the essentiality of 
utility service. Some solution had to be worked out. The 
inconvenience of the past strikes in utilities forced a oall 
for some plan of action to insure continued servioe. 
Apparently, publio sentiment would no longer allow servioe 
stoppages suoh as those of 1946 and 1947 to disrupt their 
lives and cause emergencies.
14 James J. Kilpatrick, »Virginia Keeps Its Public Utilities Banning,« Publio Utilities Fortnightly, 44:844, December 22, 1949.
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APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OP CONTINUED SERVICE
Two basic approaches to the problem of continued 
service are possible: the ownership approach and the legis­
lative approach.
The ownership approach to the problem means that 
solution to the problem of continued service would com© 
about through the ownership of the utilities. The ownership 
approach Immediately suggests two types of ownership and two 
ways of dealing with the problem of continuity of service. 
That is, the problem can be deart with through government 
ownership of some type or it can be dealt with through 
private ownership.
Government ownership means that some form of govern­
ment would take over and operate the utilities Involved in 
the problem. This might be municipal government or the 
federal government. 1
Municipal ownership exists in many parts of the 
country today. ’Eftiere It exists, the employees of the 
municipal-owned utility are considered the same as other 
municipal workers. To a great degree, this eliminates the
1 Theoretically, state governments could be a third 
form. However, ownership today exists either on the local (municipal level) or the regional level under federal control.
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threat of work stoppages since municipal governmental strikes 
are rare and practically unknown* Hot only is it considered 
antl-sooial for government employees to strike, but it is 
questionable whether municipal governmental workers have the 
legal right to strike or even to organize for bargaining 
purposes*2 It Is generally felt that strikes against all 
governments are illegal.
In addition to the purely legal aspects, strikes 
against governmental units are antl-soolal. When a munici­
pality owns and operates a utility, the people who make up 
the municipality own and operate the utility. A strike by 
workers against a municipally-owned utility would be a strike 
against the people of the municipality* In other words, to 
go on strike against a municipally-owned utility would be 
the same as striking against yourself.3
This solution to the problem of oontinued servioe 
might prove ineffective since it is merely a shift of 
emphasis. It will be recalled that there had been no strikes 
in the power Industry prior to World War II because strikes
2 Where a contract Is involved in collective bargain­ing between a municipality and Its employees, the legal status of that contract is in doubt. The state courts have held that a municipality oannot enter such contracts.Isadore Vogel, “What about the Rights of Public Employees?” 
Labor Law Journal, Hay 1950, 1:607 ft.; also see City of feprlngTleia v* cTTouse, 206 S.W. 2nd, 539, (1947).
3 The reasoning here is highly theoretical. It is very possible that It would make very little difference who owned the utility as far as the workers were concerned.
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were considered anti-social. nevertheless* the preoedent 
was broken by tha Duquesme Power strikes* and the public 
learned that custom alone was not sufficient insurance 
against service atoppagaa. It ia possible that tha precedent 
could ba broken in oonnaotion with strikes against aunlol- 
palltlas also* thus asking this type of ownership approach 
ineffective.
Federal ownership is tha other type of governmental 
ownership whioh could be used to deal with tha problem of 
oontinuad service. Federal ownership of utilities* as in 
Municipalities, exists in many sections of the country. The 
employees of federally owned utilities are considered federal 
employees, and work stoppages are practically unknown In this 
field. Under federal ownership* the federal government 
possesses the utilities and operates them. The workers are 
considered federal employees and the right to strike is 
denied them legally and socially.
3he right to strike against the federal government or 
any corporation owned by the federal government is specifi­
cally prohibited in the Taft-Hartley Act.4 The illegality 
of such strikes is certain.
Socially* the same reasoning applies here as in the 
case of municipal ownership. The government is the people.
To strike against the government Is to strike against
4 labor Management Halations Act, 29 U3CA 141,
Section 305.
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yourself. However, again there ia serious doubt that the 
application of this reasoning would be too effective. How 
far social custom and social thinking can go to stop strikes 
against the government is questionable, especially when the 
ownership is in the hands of a remote federal government.
Therefore, because of the legal and social aspects of 
federal governmental ownership, this ownership suggests an 
approach to the problem of public utility work stoppages.
Under governmental ownership (either municipal or 
federal), some sort of procedure would have to be established 
to care for the labor problems which would arise. The right 
to strike would be prohibited but some agency would be 
necessary to deal with the major and minor grievances that 
naturally come about. Beoause the right to strike would be 
taken away, presumably a compulsory arbitration procedure 
would be established. This would mean that all major griev­
ances and questions would be settled by some form of arbitra­
tion under a board, agreed upon by both parties, with the 
award or decision of the board binding on both parties.
Any ownership approaoh by government presents a 
number of problems. The problem of how to acquire the owner­
ship Itself is basic. What method should be used when these 
utilities are taken over? What condensation, if any, should 
be given to the former owners? What would be the political 
implications of suoh a move? As noted above, what would be
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the government's policy toward labor? that method of 
settling grievances would be set up? What other benefits 
would come from government ownership and operation? Bhese 
are but a few of the many problems that: would com© about 
with governmental ownership. All of these would, have to be 
solved to the satisfaction of the three parties ooncerned: 
labor, management and the public.
The second ownership approaoh to the problem, private 
ownership, is utilized in the present attempts to solve the 
problem of continuity of service. The possibility exists 
that governmental ownership may be attempted in the future 
should the methods utilizing private ownership fall. But for 
the present at least, the methods used to deal with the 
problem have all continued the ownership of the utilities 
affected In private hands.
The second major approaoh to the problem, besides 
ownership, is the legislative approach or method. If the 
ownership is to remain at its present status, then the prob­
lem must be approached by Imposing legal rules and methods 
to industrial relations in the industries affected by the
•v
problem. This is the type of approaoh whloh has been used 
to date.
To be effeotlve, the legislative approach to the 
problem would of necessity include legal notion to prohibit 
service stoppage and set up some procedure to be followed
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in settling the grievances that naturally come about.
Certain rules and procedures could be set up which would 
have to be adhered to before a strike was allowed in hopes 
of voluntary settlement. Actual service stoppages could be 
prevented by a compulsory settlement provision in the pro­
cedure or by some variation of governmental ownership and 
operation.
If legal rales and methods are to be applied to 
Industrial relations In the public utilities, there are two 
possible agenoles that could lay down these rules! the 
federal government and the state government.5
Legal procedures by the federal government are 
established by the United States Congress. It would bo 
possible for the Congress to set up laws and procedures 
that would prohibit strikes and lay down certain steps that 
would have to be followed in settling a labor dispute in the 
public utilities.
Federal legislation could be patterned after the 
Railway Labor Act of 1926 which has been used to deal with 
labor problems in the railway industry for many years. $hie 
Act sets up a prooedure designed to promote settlement of
6 Regulation by local governments Is a third theoreti­
cal possibility. However, since public utilities, as defined in Chapter II, often operate on a larger scale than the municipality and since utility management is frequently on a wider base, it seems impractical to include municipal governments as a possible source of this type of regulation.
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labor disputes without the use of strikes# If possible# In a 
vital industry, The procedure consisted baaioally of four 
steps or oondltlons that must be fulfilled before a strike 
can be executed. These four steps ares conferences, 
mediation# arbitration (on a voluntary basis) and finally# 
an Emergency fact finding board investigation of the issues 
involved.6
The primary purpose of the Railway Labor Act is to 
delay the strike or work stoppage while using all available 
means to enoourage a settlement. A similar procedure might 
be used In connection with utility disputes. However# sinoe 
the purpose of such method would be to prevent service 
stoppages, some form of' compulsion would be necessary some­
where in the steps of the procedure when applied to utilities.
Another example of federal regulation of labor disputes 
that might be used as a base for federal legislation is the 
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, better known as the 
Taft-Hartley Aot. A part of this act gives the President of 
the United States power to seize and operate an industry 
whenever a strike in that Industry shall be so serious as to 
create a "national emergency9.7
6 b. Philip Looklin, Economloa of Transportation# (Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 194157# 3rd Edition#pp. 255-7.
7 Labor Management Relations Aot, 29 USCA 141,
Sec. 206.
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In fact, there was speculation late In 1947 that the 
Taft-Hartley Aot might he applicable to utility lahor dis­
putes. . At that time the second Buqueane Power strike had 
Just ended, it was felt hy severed, students of lahor
1 i • ,
relations that a service stoppage that had such serious 
repercussions on the economy of a great industrial area 
constituted a national emergency.8
However# all utilities are not situated In suoh an 
Important Industrial area. Service stoppages In a large 
number of the utilities In the United States would not have 
such serious repercussions on the national economy as that 
of the Duquesne Power strikes. This fact provides a harrier 
to the use of the national emergency clause to regulate 
utility lahor disputes. Likewise# the Railway Lahor Act was 
designed for railroad employees. It Is based largely on the 
power of Congress to regulate matters oonoernlng Interstate 
commerce. Even amending the Aot to inolude utility labor 
might not he enough# for it is possible that the power to 
regulate interstate oommeroe could not he made to extend to 
the majority of public utilities.
Although these two statutes do not apply to' puhllo 
utilities# they still suggest a basis for federal regulation. 
That Is# the Railway Labor Aot suggests a possible solution 
in a procedural way and the Taft-Hartley Aot points to an
 STTBowen# "Will the Taft-Hartley Aot stop utilitystrikes?* Public Utilities Fortnightly, 40:631-5, November 6, 1947. — —  —  — ■
8?
alternative devlee. A similar prooedure to that of the 
Railway Labor Act oould be eet up with the arbitration awards 
binding on both parties# or governmental seizure# similar to 
the Taft-Hartley emergency olaase# oould be used.
At the present tine# the federal legislative approaoh 
has not been attempted. This nay be due to the faot that 
the majority of the present regulations regarding the public 
utilities are on a state governmental level. Furthermore, 
service stoppages nay not be important enough to warrant 
regulation on the federal level. That is# service stoppages 
in one utility nay not affect the national picture to such a 
degree as to call for congressional action.
Sven though the federal legislative approaoh is aot 
being used at present# it Is still a possible solution to 
the problem of continued service. Should the problem beoome 
wide enough in scope or should atteepts to solve the problem 
on other levels fail# the federal type of regulation might 
be a possible solution.
The state government is the second possible agency 
which oould be utilized In the regulation of utility labor 
relations. It is through this source that the most recent 
attempts have been made to solve the problem.
State legislation affecting labor relations la not 
particularly new in the United States. For example, 
"Workmen's Compensation" laws were passed by the states as
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early aa the turn of the century to regulate the payments 
made to injured workers* and to regulate Industry in an 
attempt to prevent aooldents.
Throughout this long period of regulation there have 
been few. laws that have been directed toward utility labor 
relatione. Most of our attempts to regulate labor relations 
in the public services have been in the railroad field, whloh 
does not come under the definition of utilities for the 
purposes of this study.
It is true that the State of Kansas set up a Court of 
Industrial Relations in 1920 which had the power to regulate 
all matters concerning public, utilities. This court had the 
power to regulate wages, hours, working conditions and even 
strikes and other methods of industrial warfare. In addition, 
the court had the power to regulate the servioes of a great 
many other industries.9 Although this law remains on the 
statute books of the State of Kansas today, it was declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court In 1923.10 It was, 
however, the first attempt by any state to regulate utility
i *labor relations and, as suoh, has played a large part in 
laying the groundwork for more recent legislation.
The bulk of the state legislation to regulate utility
9 Laws of Kansas, 1920, o. 29.
10 Wolff Paoking Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522, (1923); 267 U. S. 552, (1925).
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labor relations has come la the fast tern years. fhen th© 
public became aware of the essentiality of utility service ' 
and the inconvenience that service stoppage loosed, state 
regulation of many types was enacted.
la a special report on labor legislation affecting 
utilities before the American Bar Association in September, 
1947, it was found that all states except four (Mississippi,
i
Nevada, Vermont, and test Virginia) had some sort of regu­
lation that affected utility labor relations, of these 
laws, some affected utilities only (such as ant I-strike laws) 
while others affected all labor relations including utilities 
(such as prohibition of secondary boycotts).3'̂
this study shows that in 1947 nine states prohibited 
strikes, «lgh% states, provided' for cooling off periods,' ten - 
states required secret ballots before a strike could be 
called, twenty^eight states had- provisions for-fact-finding 
boards to investigate the strikes, eight states required 
compulsory arbitration, five states had state seizure pro­
visions, fourteen states prohibited closed shops, four states 
required a vote before closed shop would be allowed, thirteen 
states forbade an automatic Check-off, twelve states required 
the union to file certain -reports, twenty-three states 
allowed suits against unions, and sixteen states prohibited
1 li'Ieport of Special Committee on labor legislation
in Public Utility Field, 1946-1947, presented at annual
meeting, September 22-23, 1947, Cleveland, Ohio, American 
Bar Association.
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secondary boycotts.12
Of the laws referred to above, the most important 
ones for the purposes of this paper are those statutes which 
deal directly with public utility lahor relations: the anti­
strike type of legislation, compulsory arbitration procedure 
and the state seizure provisions.
1 2 Report of Special Committee . . ., loo, oit.
CHAPTER ?
STATE AST I-STRIKE LEClSUlTIOH
Anti-strike legislation is found in the statutes of 
ten of our states. These laws are aimed directly at the 
problem of continuity of service and have incorporated all 
those provisions considered necessary in order to bring 
about continued service, namely, prohibition of strikes and 
some method of dealing with grievances either through com­
pulsory arbitration or governmental selsure and operation.
(See Table 1|,
All of these statutes are a direct reaction to a 
specific problem which occurred in the utility field in 1946 
and 194?, that of continuity of service.
Consideration of anti-strike laws is broken down into 
two main parts: policy provisions and procedural provisions.
Sine© the aim of the ten laws is basically the same, 
it is to be expected that the policy laid down in all the 
statutes would be similar. Generally# If is found that all 
the statutes have a declaration of policy, a section that 
has to do with definitions and specific industries covered, 
a portion listing certain exemptions to the .aot* a collective 
bargaining provision# a guarantee of the rights of individuals 
to cult their 4©bs, and some provisions for the rights of 
appeal or review of the action of the laws.
tft£££ X
f u n  LmwLAfio® m m nm  public u m m  labor1
state ■ strike® Prohibited
Compulsory
Arbitration
State Seizure..
Florida X X
Indiana. X X
Massachusetts * X
Michigan X X
Missouri X X X
Nebraska ' X X ,
Mew Jersey X X X
Pennsylvania
?
X x .
Virginia
Wisconsin X X
X
The declaration of policy usually states the 
essentiality of the services provided and sets down the 
policy of the state in cases where Interruption is threatened 
or actually occurs. The declaration of policy in the Indiana 
statutes Is typical:
^ Law® of ‘ Florida,; 1947, e . 23911, (I. B, 954); Laws 
of Indiana# 1947, e. 341; Laws of Massachusetts, 1947, o. 595; 
Public Act Mo. 175, Laws of 1939 as amended Laws of 1947#
S. B. 254* Law# of Missouri, 1947# H. B. 180; Laws of Nebraska, 
1047# e. 178, (L. B. 537); Laws of Mew Jersey# 1940, c. 38; 
Laws of Mew Jersey# 1947# e. 47; Laws of Pennsylvania, 1947, 
c. 495, (S. B. 801); Acts of Assembly {Virginia), 1947, ©. 9; 
Laws of ilsconsin, 1947# c. 414, (S. B. 91).
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It Is hereby declared to be the public policy of the State of Indiana that it is neoessary and 
essential in the public interest to facilitate the prompt, peaceful and just settlement of labor disputes between public utility employers and their 
employees whloh oause or threaten to cause an inter­ruption in the supply of services neoessary to the. health, safety and. well-being of the citizens of 
Indiana, and to that end to encourage the making and maintaining of agreements concerning wages, hours • and other conditions of employment through collective bargaining between publio utility employers and their employees, and to provide settlement procedures for labor disputes between public utility employers and their employees in cases where the collective bargaining process has reached an impasse and stale­mate and as a result thereof, the parties are unable to effect such agreement and which labor disputes, if not settled, are likely to cause an Interruption of the supply of the publio utility service on which the community so affected is so* dependent that severe hardship would be inflicted on a substantial number of persons by a cessation of such service.2
Nine of the laws have declarations of policy aimed 
directly at public utilities. In the Mlohigan statute, the 
portion of the act direoted at public utilities has been 
added as an amendment to an earlier law dealing with all 
labor relations in the state, Therefore, the declaration of 
policy of the Michigan statute is extremely broad and con­
siders all labor disputes to be contrary to the publio
Interest.S
After setting out the public polioy and declaring the 
continuity of service of public utilities to be solothed
2 Laws Of Indiana, 1947* o. 341, sec. 1.
3 Public Aot No. 176, Laws of 1939 as amended Laws 
of 1947, S.B. 264, seo. 1.
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with the public interest®; the statutes generally define the 
terms as used in the law. The most Important definition of 
terns is the definition of those industries that are con­
sidered public utilities under the act. Generally# those 
utilities providing heat# electric light and power, gas, 
water, communications and transportation are oovered by the 
acts.
In all cases except Michigan, the statutes carefully 
define the industries to be covered. Since the portion of 
the Michigan act covering utilities is an amendment to an 
over-all labor relations aot, there is no definition of the 
term "public utility®.4
When it is recalled that the Philadelphia transit 
strike was one of the major incidents that called attention 
to the necessity for anti-strike laws, it is interesting to 
note that the Pennsylvania statute does not cover transpor­
tation. Likewise, the nation-wide telephone strike of 1947 
called attention to the essentiality of service, and yet the 
Pennsylvania statute excludes communications from its 
coverage also.^ The Massachusetts statute also excludes 
transportation and communications.®
However, whereas the Massachusetts definition of
“ 4 Public Aot Ho. 176, Laws of 1939 as amended Lawsof 1947, S. B. 264, seo. 1.
5 Laws of Pennsylvania, 1947, o. 485, sec. 2.
6 Laws of Massachusetts, 1947, c. 596, seo. 1.
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covered industries excludes these two basic types# it includes 
several which are not considered in the other states. Thus# 
Massachusetts includes food# fuel (rather than heat)# hospital 
and medical service# as well as the basic water, electric
light and power# and gas classifications.^
*
The Mew Jersey and Missouri statutes# which are more 
comprehensive and exacting in their definitions of utilities# 
include sanitation as well as the standard coverages enuaw 
crated in the preceding paragraph.8
Railway labor or labor regulated by the federal govern­
ment are specifically exempt from the law. This Is done by 
a flat statement that the act does not apply where the
national Railway labor Act is applicable euch as in the
Florida statute,8 or It is done by some other device such as 
In the Pennsylvania act which limits the jurisdiction of the 
statute to those industries subject to the jurisdiction and 
control of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.10
She statutes generally continue on with definitions 
of other terms that are used in each act. In some of the 
statutes, these definitions of teres are long and comprehensive
7 Laws of Massachusetts# 1947# c. 896# seo. 2.
8 Laws of Mew Jersey, 1948, e. 38, sec. 1; Laws ofMissouri, 1947, H. B. 180# sec. 2.
9 Laws of Florida, 1947# c. 23911, sec. 13.
10 Laws of Pennsylvania# 1947, c. 485, seo. 2.
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such as the Nebraska aot with its nine long definitions of 
terms,H while in others, such as Indiana, merely define the 
industries covered and the term collective b a r g a i n i n g . 12
All but three (Missouri, Massachusetts and Nebraska) 
of the ten statutes specifically protect ,and encourage 
collective bargaining as a device to settle industrial 
disputes. In four of the statutes, Florida, Indiana, 
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, collective bargaining is required 
as the first step of the procedural settlement of disputes. 
The wording of this section of the statutes is exactly the 
same in all four. It reads:
It shall be the duty of publio utility employers and their employees in publio utility operations to exert every reasonable effort to settle such labor disputes by making agreement through collective bargaining between the parties, and by maintaining thereof when made, and to prevent, if possible, the collective bargaining process from reaching a state of Impasse and stalemate.*3
The New Jersey and Virginia statutes reaffirm the 
right to bargain collectively. Both state that collective 
bargaining is basic to industrial peace and is to be
11 taws of Nebraska, 1947, c. 178, sec. 1.
12 Even here the term "collective bargaining" is 
defined simply. The aot states that the term is defined as meaning the same as the term used in the National Labor Relations Aot. Laws of Indiana, 194?, o. 341, sec. 2.
13 Laws of Florida, 1947, o. 23911, sec. l; Laws of Indiana, 1947, c. 341, sec. 1; Laws of Pennsylvania, 1947, o. 485, sec. 1; and Laws of Wisconsin, 1947, e. 4i4, seo. 1.
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retained.1̂  The ISlohigan aot has a general guarantee of the 
right to bargain collectively for all types of employees.15
Although the Missouri statute does not specifically 
guarantee collective bargaining, it tacitly upholds this 
right In that it requires all agreements arising out of 
collective bargaining to be in written form and have a life 
of one year.I® In addition, the Missouri statute further 
upholds the necessity of collective bargaining In that it 
requires that: "upon receipt of notice of any labor dispute
between parties subjeot to this aot, the board shall require 
such parties to keep it advised as to the progress of 
negotiations therein" .17 Likewise, the Massachusetts statute 
does not specifically guarantee collective bargaining rights 
although it states that oolleotive bargaining Is to be 
encouraged and that the law takes effect "in the event that 
the commissioner of labor and industries finds that a labor 
dispute has not been settled by oolleotive bargaining".18
The third statute which does not specifically 
guarantee oolleotive bargaining rights is that of Nebraska.
n 14 Laws of New Jersey, 1946, c. 38, sec. 2; Acts of
Assembly (Virginia), 1947, o. 9, seo. 2.
15 Publio Act of Michigan No. 176, Laws of 1939 as 
amended Laws of 1947, 3. B. 264..
16 Laws of Missouri, 1947, H. B. 180, sec. 10.
17 Ibid., sec. 8, (Italics mine).
18 Laws of Massachusetts, 1947, o. 596, seo. 3.
In fact, nowhere in the whole act does the term "collective 
bargainings - appear. This seems to be due primarily to the' 
foot that the Nebraska statute sets up a Court of Industrial
Relations to deal with matters concerning governmental* , * * • . ■< 
service , (primarily where the government operates publio
utilities in its proprietary capacity) and publio utilities.: 
is aimed at providing some procedure to settle 
grievances that arise under governmental ownership and the 
portion relating to the privately owned utilities of rela­
tively small importance.18
Even though the Nebraska aot toes not mention collec­
tive bargaining- as such# a portion of section Id of the act, 
which lays down the procedure to be followed by. the Court, 
seems bo require bargaining by utilities not controlled by 
the state government, fhis portion of the section reads:
. . .  in the event of an industrial dispute 
between employer and employee of a public utility 
not operated by the government in its proprietary 
capacity# where such employer and employee have 
failed or refused to bargain In-.good faith, con­
cerning the matters in dispute, the court m ^n 
order bargaining to be: begun or .resumed . .20
It is important that the acts encourage and protect 
collective bargaining. Should this basic step in the settle­
ment of industrial disputes be overlooked, the procedure 
laid down would tend, to be by-passed and free bargaining
I& kawe "of Nebraska, 1947, c. 178. 
88 Ibid., sec, 18.
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across the bargaining table would be lost. When compulsory 
arbitration Is substituted for bargaining* the freedom of 
action and flexibility of form and procedure of the latter 
is lost to the static procedure and compulsion of the former,
The fifth type of policy provision found in the 
statutes is that dealing with the right of an individual to 
quit his Job. Nine of the ten statutes specifically guaran­
tee the right to quit or state that the acts in no way can 
be construed to force *involuntary servitude*. The wording 
of the Hew Jersey statute typifies this type of provision:
Ho employee shall be required to render labor or service without his consent* nor shall this aot 
be oonstrued to make the quitting of his labor and service by the individual employee an illegal aot; 
nor shall any court issue any prooess to compel the performance by any individual of such labor or service without his consent.21
The one statute which does not guarantee this impor­
tant right of individuals to quit their Jobs is that of 
Virginia.22 The reason for this is the peculiar procedure 
of the Virginia act. The Virginia act does not prohibit 
strikes as such* but it does have state seizure provisions, 
(see Table I* page 32). Since strikes are allowable* 
whether on the Job or actual strikes# the Virginia legislature 
apparently felt that there is no necessity to guarantee the
51 XaweTof Hew Jersey# 1946# o. 38# seo. 16.
22 Acts of Assembly (Virginia)# 1947, c. 9.
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right to quit the job. More shall be said about this 
peculiar procedure later.23
The last major policy provision is procedure for 
appeals and rights of review. In three of the statutes* 
Indiana* Florida and Wisconsin, the wording of the aots in 
regard to appeal are very similar. These acts lay down the 
possible grounds for appeal and the procedure to be used.
The wording of the Indiana statute is typical:
Either party to the dispute nay* within fifteen 
days from the date such order is filed with the 
cleric of the court* petition the circuit court of 
any county in which the employer operates or has an 
office or place of business* for a review of such 
order on the ground (a) that the parties were not 
given reasonable opportunity to be heard, or (b) 
that the board of arbitration exceeded its powers* 
or (e) that the order is unreasonable in that it 
is not supported by the evidence* or (d) that the 
order was procured by fraud* collusion or other 
unlawful means or methods. A summons to the other 
party to the dispute shall be Issued as provided 
by law in ether civil cases* and either party 
shall have the same rights to a change of venue 
from the county, or tc a change of judge as pro­
vided by law for other civil cases . . • The 
decisions of the Judge of the eirouit court 
shall be final . .
The Pennsylvania statute has a similar type of appeal 
provision in that it also sets down the possible grounds for 
appeal. However* it provides a rather complicated procedure 
for appeal tc the Court of Common Pleas* then to the Superior
23 bee pp. 66 ff.
24 haws of Indiana* 1947, e. 341* see. 12. The 
Florida statute allows appeal to the Supreme Court.
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The Michigan aot, which includes all labor disputes, 
has a general clause allowing "proper legal or equitable 
remedy or relief in any oourt of competent jurlsdictiontt.30
It is interesting to note that the Hew Jersey- -sot* 
the first to he phased and. to some extent copied by many 
other states, has no right of appeal written in the statute. 
The only mention of court action is in connection with 
recovery of -fines levied by the law*3! ' ironically enough, 
it is under the Raw Jersey aot that most of the rulings of 
the court# affecting this type of legislation have arisen, 
as will fee noted later*
these- six major policy provisions* m  noted above, lay 
a groundwork within which these statute# operat#'. However, 
the-more important and more interesting provisions of this 
type of legislative approaoh to the problem of continued 
.service are -found in the procedural provisions. It la in 
the procedural provisions that the actual, approaoh to the- 
problem 1# attempted, it-1# in' these provisions -that the 
ten laws differ most drastically and show the many possible 
roads open under the legislative approach to the problem.
Procedural provisions- seem to fall Into, three 
patterns or categories. The Kansas pattern, setting up a
"  ""5ff~FufeTio Act# of Michigan Me. 176, haw#, of 1939 mamended law# of 1917, S, B. 264,'sec.. 22a.
31 haws of Mew Jersey, 1946, c.38, sec. 8*
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Court of Industrial Relations similar to the defunct 1920 
Kansas Court, is followed by the statute In Nebraska. The 
Indiana pattern, utilizing compulsory arbitration, is 
followed by the statutes of Florida, Indiana, Michigan, 
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. The New Jersey pattern, ending 
in state seizure of the utility as well as using compulsory 
arbitration in some oases, is followed by the statutes of 
New Jersey, Missouri, Massachusetts and Virginia.
As noted above,32 the Nebraska statute sets up a 
Court of Industrial Relations that is charged with Juris­
diction over industrial disputes Involving governmental 
service in a proprietary capacity or service of a publio 
utility.*53 Thus the aim of the Nebraska statute is double- 
barreled: to regulate labor disputes in the publio utilities
end to set up a procedure to regulate labor disputes in the 
governmental service where strikes are absolutely forbidden.
Although the Nebraska statute is quite long and 
exacting in setting up the Court of Industrial Relations, 
the procedure for settlement of disputes that fall within 
the Jurisdiction of the oourt is relatively simple. After 
Jurisdiction has been established in a oase, the oourt 
merely hears both sides of the oase and sets down its find­
ings in the form of an order which is entered as a matter of
------ 32 "See"page 3? ff.
33 Laws of Nebraska, 1947, o. 178, seo. 10.
the court's records.31 the orders of the oourt, * whether 
temporary or final# are binding oh all parties involved and 
hare -the same effect as like orders-' entered by a district' 
court of the stats 'and are enforceable in the, regular courts ■ 
of #ie sf^tc^b
Wmt .the. statute does# in effect, is to establish, a 
legal-/body somewhat like a district court and somewhat like 
e., regulatory commission charged with the handling## labor -: . 
disputes# As evidence of this point* the Governor, with 
consent of the' legislature, appoints the .-three judges, of the 
court for: six, years with the terns of office -expiring every. 
two- years; the .Judges are chosen on -the basis -of their' 
esperienoe and knowledge of legal, financial, labor and. 
Industrial matters only; the compensation of the- .Judges- is ' 
provided' from stats funds;, the office; of' the court is in the 
Capitol building in Lincoln; the Clerk' of 'the Supreme Court. 
of .Nebraska is ex-officio olerk .of the Court of Industrial 
Eolations and as part of his- duties he transmits copies of 
testimony before the -Court of industrial Eolations to the 
iapreme Court* the court has 'full powers to make, its own 
rule# to. govern its proceedings, issue process, subpoena 
wltnesses, administer oaths and compel testimony, juris­
diction of the court may M  invoked by cither party, the
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Attorney General of Nebraska, the Governor of Nebraska or 
the court Itself; the oourt uses the Code of Civil procedure 
used in district courts of Nebraska unless modified by its 
own order; all appeals shall be taken to the Supreme Court 
in the same manner as appeals from district courts; and the 
oourt has powers similar to any other legal court in regard 
to a seal# publishing summons in newspapers and employment 
of experts to assist the oourt.36
In making its arbitration awards# the Court is 
governed in establishing rates of pay and other conditions 
of employment by the statute. The standard established la 
the statute reads:
. . . the Court of Industrial Relations shall establish rates of pay and conditions of employment which are comparable to the prevalent wage rates paid and conditions of employment maintained for the same or similar work of workers exhibiting like or similar skills under the same or similar working conditions# In the same labor market area and# If none, in adjoining labor market areas within the state . . . Hie oourt shall determine in each case what constitutes "the same labor market area** or 
"adjoining labor market areas . . .37
In order to make the establishment of the Court of 
Industrial Relations of even greater benefit to the people 
of Nebraska, the statute provides that the Court may be 
used as an arbitration board for any industrial dispute even
$& Laws ' of Nebraska, 1947, o. 178, sec. 4 through 9 
and sec. 11 through 15.
37 Ibid., seo. IS.
though the dispute is outside the Court1 s Jurisdiction. the 
Court must consent to arbitrate the dispute and the award 
becomes binding as if if ©am® under the Court's Jurisdiction.*58 
The statute absolutely forbids any strike, lookout or 
work stoppage. It makes it an illegal act for any person to 
encourage such acts or to assist such acts. It further pro-
. . . .  \ i
rides fines of fro® #10 to #5,000 and imprisonment of from 
fire days to one year for violations of the section that pro­
hibits strikes and lookouts. ̂9
The Nebraska act is aimed, in part, at labor disputes 
in the governmental service. The wording of the statute is 
such'that all types of governmental service' and ail.sorts of 
possible- labor difficulties in the .governmental .service are 
covered. The words *or public utilities* seem to have been 
attached to the phraseology as an after-thought* Neverthe­
less, the Nebraska act does provide one method of . dealing 
with the problem of continued servio e.
The second pattern or type of procedural provision 
follows the Indiana statute closely. The distinguishing
featured of this pattern, followed by five states, Is that it
relies on compulsory arbitration as a device to solve the 
problem of continuity of service.
The Indiana statute Is one of the earliest of the ten
— " '" gSHuaws~of Nebraska, 194?, c. 1?B, sec,' BO.
59 ibid. , seo. Bl.
a© is in point of adoption, toeing preceded only toy the first 
Hew. JCrsey apt. aad„ the firgicia,.. act. it, was- based, to a 
great degree, on & plan, proposed toy Lee H. Hill, former ,
member of tiie National • far Labor Board. and now a. member of
Roger .at. Blade,. (Management Consultants, in an. editorial in. the 
Meotrloai World.40 . / "
The Indiana statu teprovldes for the appointment toy
the Governor of a panel of persons to serve as conciliators 
under the act and another- panel to serve as arbitrators. No ' 
person may serve on both panels; the members of the panels 
mast be ©Itizens of .the state who, in the jua^ent of the 
#overnor, qualify to the requisite of experience and capa­
bility; appointments are- to be without consideration of 
political aftilvlation; each member must take an oath to 
perform his duties honestly and to the best of his ability. 
Compensation for the members* activities is provided.41
Statutes of other states which, fall; in this pattern 
differ in; only minor respects, for instance, the Wisconsin 
®mplopient:-'Belftfions Board makes the appointments in the case, 
of Wisconsin.4^ In Pennsylvania the members are chosen toy
the Governor from-a list of recommendations submitted'by the
* ' ' ■ " *
": ."401 Arbitration law,” Business feck, April 5, 1947,
p . 99.
41 Laws of Indiana, 1947, e. 341, sec. 4.
Labor-Management Advisory Committee.43 la the case of 
Florida, the Governor appoints a separate conciliator for 
each dispute on petition by either party to a dispute.44 
fbe statutes also vary somewhat on the number of members on 
these panels.
the Michigan statute, designed to regulate all labor 
relations, provides for a permanent Labor Mediation Board 
that has Jurisdiction over all labor disputes including 
public utility labor matters.43
fash of the laws provides tot the oonciliatore are 
called into a dispute only after collective bargaining has 
reached am “impasse and stalemate* and on petition of either 
party to a dispute to t o  Governor or Board, depending on 
who administer# the act. The Governor or Board is to con­
sider the petition and “if, in his opinion, the dispute, if 
not settled, will cause or is likely to cause the interrup­
tion of the supply of the service on which tit® community so 
affected is so dependent tot severe hardship would be 
inflicted on a substantial number of persons by a cessation 
of such service . . .“, t o  Governor or Board is to appoint
' ■' 43 haws of Pennsylvania, 1947, o. 485, sec. 4.
44 Laws of Florida, 1947, c. 23911, sec, 4.
45 Public Acts of Michigan No. 173, Laws of 1939 a#amended Laws of 1947, S. B. 264, sec. 3,
a conciliator from the previously established panel.4s 
tinder the Pennsylvania statute, the Pennsylvania 
labor Halations Board may also initiate petition to the 
Governor for appointment of a conciliator.d7
the inties of the conciliator are to meet with the 
dispating parties and make every effort possible to bring 
about'a settlement of the dispute. Bering the period, in . 
which the conciliator is attesting voluntary settlement, any 
Service stoppage, strike or lookout is forbidden and Illegal.
Should conciliation fail, the next step is arbitration. 
The conciliator is given thirty days to effect a settlement 
of the dispute (fifteen days in t o  case of Wisconsin and m  
limit in the ease of Michigan^81. At the end of that time, 
the governor or Board appoints a board from the previously 
established panel to arbitrate the dispute.
The governor- 'appoints three arbitrators with t o  - 
exceptions of Wisconsin, where both parties choose the 
members. from a list submitted by t o  • Wisconsin J^loyment 
Halations Board, and Florida, where the governor selects a 
public member while each of the parties provides Its own
r: 46 Xaws of Indiana, 1947, c. 341, sec. 5.
47 laws of Pennsylvania, 1947,- e. 485, sec* 5.
48 haws of Wisconsin, e. 414, sec. S; Public Act of Michigan Ho. 176, laws Of 1939 as amended, laws of 1947,
3. B. 264, sec. 9a.
members.4$
la Hi© Pennsylvania set another step Is inserted before 
arbitration which is not found in the other acts that follow 
this pattern, fhe ̂ oyeraor requires the Pennsylvania Labor 
Itelsiiooe’-Board to hold an election among the employees on . 
the question, *shall the’ employer1 s offer be aoeeptedf* If 
the majority 'voting favor aoeeptanoe, the offer becomes 
effeotivei if not, ̂ arbitration, is 'the next step.BO
¥h$ Michigan statute differs from the others in that 
It requires the appointment, as arbitration board chairman, 
of a circuit Judge by the presiding circuit lodge of the 
State. Ihe other members on tbs board are direct representa­
tives of each party to the dispute.#!
In the arbitration procedure of the Indiana and 
Pennsylvania acts, each side of the dispute Is allowed to 
designate one representative to sit with the board In an 
advisory capacity only. Ho vote Is allowed these representa­
tives.5̂
In all of the statutes, the Board of arbitration holds
49 Laws of Wisconsin, o. 414, sec. 5; Law® of Florida, 1947, c. 23911, sec. 6.
50 Laws of Pennsylvania, 1947, o. 485, sec. 7.
51 Public Act of Michigan Mo. 170, Laws of 1939 as amended by Laws of 1947, S. B. 264, sec. 13.
m. Laws of Indiana, 1947, 0. 041, sec. 7; Laws of 
Pennsylvania, 1947, c. 485, sec. 9.
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hearings and gives both parties adequate opportunity to he 
heard. These boards have the power to compel attendance and 
subpoena evldenoe as well as administer oaths. The findings 
of the boards are to be written, and the board's decisions, 
or orders ■, are to be based only on the Issues of the dispute 
and the evidence presented.
Where a valid contract exists, the deolsions of the 
boards are limited to interpretation and application of the 
contract Involved. Where there is no contract, where a new 
contract is being negotiated, or where amendments to an 
existing contract are under question, the boards have the 
power to establish rates of pay; and conditions of employment.
The standard to be used by the boards in determining 
wages and conditions is very similar to that required under 
the above mentioned Nebraska statute. The Florida statute 
is typical:
. . . the board shall establish rates of pay and conditions of employment which are comparable to the prevailing wage rates paid and conditions of employment maintained by the same or similar publio utility employers, if any, in the same labor market area, and if none, in adjoining labor market areas within the State of Florida, and if none, in adjoining labor market areas in states bordering on the State of Florida . . . The board shall determine in each oase * . . what constitutes "the same labor market area* or "adjoining labor market areas*. .
The board is governed in deciding wages, and 
conditions by the above standards as well as the value of
53 Taws “of Florida, 1947, e. 23911, sec. 8.
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service to the consumer in the Wisconsin statute. In 
addition, the Wisconsin board is allowed to establish 
separate wage.rates and separate conditions of employment 
where separate plants of the employer are located in differ­
ent areas.
Most of the Boards of Arbitration must hand down their 
orders within sixty days after their appointment, {thirty 
days in Wisconsin and M i c h i g a n 5 ^ ), unless the Governor 
extends the time period, fhe decision of any two of the 
arbitrators constitutes the order of the board. Each party 
of the dispute is furnished a copy of the decision, and a 
certified copy Is filed with the clerk of the circuit court 
where the employer operates. In Wisconsin, the Public 
Service Commission also receives a copy of the decision.56
The order of the board is binding on both parties 
and Is effective for a period of one year from date of the 
order unless changed by appeal.
Appeal to the order of the board was considered under 
policy provisions above.57 It is sufficient to say that
54 Laws of Wisconsin, 1947, e. 414, sec. 7.
55 Ibid., sec. 9; Public Act of Michigan No. 176, Lawsof 1939 as amended Laws of 1947, S. B. 264, sec. 3.
56 Laws of Wisconsin, 1947, c. 414, sec. 7.
57 See.p. 40 ff.
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eaoh of the acts provides the right of review as well as the 
possible grounds for appeal.
In order to insure continuity of service, the statutes 
make it unlawful for any group to oall a strike; any employer 
to look out his employees; any groups or persons to encourage 
a strike, lookout or work stoppage; or any groups to assist 
any of these acts. Violations of the statutes are to be 
considered misdemeanors and punishable by fines or imprison­
ment or both.
The fines vary according to the states. Wisconsin 
specifies none within the act but charges the oourts of the 
state with enforcement. Whereas Florida imposes a #1,000 
fine or six months imprisonment for eaoh individual who 
violates the act, and a #10,000 a day fine for each day of 
servloe stoppage on the organization that violates the act.58
Indiana, Florida and Pennsylvania allow injured 
persons to secure an injunction to restrain and enjoin the 
violation of the act that has adversely affeoted them.59
From the discussion of the laws which follow the 
Indiana pattern of policy provisions, two major steps oan be 
noted: oonoillation and compulsory arbitration. The basic
58 Laws of Wisconsin, 1947, o. 414, sec. 12; Lawsof Florida, 1947, o. 23911, sec. 11, 12.
59 Laws of Indiana, 1947, o. 341, sec. 14; Laws ofFlorida, 1947, c. 23911, seo. 13; and Laws of Pennsylvania,
1947, o. 485, seo. 15.
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idea of this pattern, compulsory arbitration, has also been 
Incorporated into some of the statutes falling within the 
Hew Jersey pattern, which will.be considered next*
Hew Jersey was the first to attempt solution to the 
problem of continuity of service. Early in 1946, following 
the first important service stoppages of the post-war period, 
the legislature of Hew Jersey passed an act designed to deal 
with this problem. The New Jersey aot was in use for over a 
year and had been amended once before other states followed 
the lead and passed legislation aimed at the problem. In 
other words, it was this early New Jersey aot that pointed 
the way to one method of dealing with the problem of continuity 
of service. The distinguishing characteristic of this early 
act was that it provided for state seizure and operation of 
the struck plant, a variation of the governmental ownership 
approach.60
All of these procedures begin with an affirmation of 
collective bargaining. It Is only after the collective 
bargaining procedure has broken down that these patterns or 
other attempts to deal with the problem are used. The New 
Jersey pattern is no exception to this procedure.
The New Jersey and the Missouri statutes provide for 
a State Board of Mediation to handle utility labor matters.
In the case of New Jersey, the Board was already in existence
60 haws of New Jersey, 1946, c. 38.
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and needed only to have Its powers broadened, while in the 
case of Missouri* the law sets up the State Board of 
Mediation.
in New Jersey, the State Board of Mediation i© given 
the power to determine who shall be the representatives of 
the employees and certain duties pertaining to oontraets and 
mediation in public utilities labor disputes.®*
The Missouri State Board of Mediation is composed of 
five members, two of whom are employers of labor and two are
bona fide members of some trade union. The fifth member,
appointed by the Governor, is the Chairman of the Board.62 
The chairman, a full-time employee of the state, maintains 
the Board’s offices in Jefferson City.65 other members of 
the Board are on a per deim basis and receive expenses.64
The Massachusetts and Virginia, aots are administered 
by the Governors of eaoh of these states rather than by a 
state board as in New Jersey and Missouri.65
The statutes of New Jersey and Missouri require that 
all present and future labor contracts be reduced to a
61 Laws of New Jersey, 1946, sec. 5.
62 Laws of Missouri, 1947, H. B. 180, seo. 3.
63 Ibid., seo. 4.
64 Ibid., secs. 5, 6.
65'Laws of Massachusetts, 1947, o. 596; Aots of Assembly (Virginia), 1947, o. 9.
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written form and have a life of at least one year. All 
proposed changes in these contracts must be filed with the 
board of mediation in eaoh state at least sixty days before 
termination of the contract.®® The Virginia statute also 
requires notice of proposed changes to be filed. This notice 
must be filed with the Governor. It specifies the proposed 
change, time, and place of a meeting to discuss the proposal 
within sixty days of the filing.®7
Through this process of making all contracts written 
and causing all proposed changes to be in writing and filed 
with the board of mediation or Governor# the state agency 
which is charged with carrying out the procedure is notified 
of the possibility of future action. This gives the agency 
time to prepare for possible action should negotiations 
between the parties fail*
The Missouri State Board of Mediation requires that 
the parties to a dispute keep it advised as to the progress 
of the negotiations. Further, upon application by either 
party or the Board Itself, the State Board may fix a place 
and time for a conference and may require attendance by both 
parties.68 This conference method is designed to supplement
66 Laws of New Jersey, 1946, c* 38, secs. 4, 5, 6;Laws of Missouri, 1947, B. B. 180, sec. 10 — 13.
67 Aots of Assembly (Virginia), 1947, c. 9, sec. 4.
68 Laws of Missouri, 1947 » H. B. 180, seo. 8.
the regular bargaining process and. attempts to bring the 
parties together before a n y  compulsory procedures are forced 
on. either party.
■ the' fiew. jersey and. Missouri acts specify that oollee- . 
tire bargaining is to continue until the termination of the : 
contract# 'that is# for -the full sixty days after' notice- of 
change in the contract has been filed. If, at the end of 
-tfoai period no solution has' been worked out# a fublic Hearing 
Panel is set up to hear the case.
. fhe public Hearing Panel is made up of three persons.' 
Hach of the parties to- the dispute designates a. person to 
represent them and these two designate a rthird disinterested 
and i^artlal person*, fae Basel has fifteen .days within 
which to hold public hearings on the specific -changes 
revested In' the contract, fhis time limit of fifteen days 
may be extended on agreement of both parties, both parties 
are to be represented at the hearings and the panel Is to 
file its findings with the Soremop within fir© days after' 
the closing, of its hearings-.^
In‘ case the two represeatatiyes of the parties to the ' 
dispute cannot agree on a third person as the impartial 
member, the hoard makes the appointment. In case either 
party or both, parties', fall ■ to designate their own
W  laws of Hew lersey, 1946, c. 38, sees. 8, 9,10,11; laws of Missouri# -1947,- B. B. 180, secs. 14, lb#. 18, 17.
representatives within the specified time, the Board again 
makes the appointment hat allows the party concerned to select 
a preference from a list of five persons suggested by the 
loard.^O
- Under the He*' Jersey and. Missouri acts* should either' 
party to, the dispute refuse to accept the recommendation of 
the public Hearing Panel* the Governor Is to review the 
dispute and, if in his opinion #th© failure of continued 
operation of the public utility threatens the public interest, 
health and welfare**, he may seise the utility in the name of 
the State.71 Thus, the recommendation of the Panel is 
binding unless either party wishes state seizure.
The Governor is empowered to make rules and regulations 
to keep the utility in operation. He may put the operation 
of the utility In the hands of any state agency or department 
he may designate, fhe utility is to be returned to the 
owners *aa soon thereafter as possible after settlement of 
the dispute* J7̂
In April, 1947, after a series of cases and disputes 
that Invoked the Hew Jersey act, the Hew Jersey legislature 
amended the earlier law so that one additional step was
":,r v" 7G Laws of Mew Jersey, 1946, c. 38, sec . 12; haws of
Missouri, 1947, H. B. 180, sec. 18.
71 haws of Hew Jersey, 1946, c. 38, sec. 13; Lms ofMissouri, 1947, H. B. 180, seo. 19.
imposed after state seizure. Should no settlement have come 
about within ten days after the Governor has taken possession 
of the plant* the dispute is submitted to a Board of 
Arbitration.73
The Board of Arbitration is composed of five members. 
The method of choosing these members is similar to the method 
used in choosing the public Hearing Panel in that eaoh party 
to the dispute designates a member to be its representative 
and these two designate three disinterested and impartial 
persona. The same procedure is used in case of failure to 
agree on the impartial members or in case either party or 
both parties fall to designate a person to represent them.74
Within thirty days# the Board holds hearings, gathers 
all the facts about the dispute# makes written findings of 
fact and hands down its decision. The findings and decision 
of the Board of Arbitration are filed with the Board of 
Mediation, the Governor, and a oopy is sent to eaoh party.
The decision is binding on all parties.73
The insertion of the Board of Arbitration into the 
procedure was designed to prevent a stalemate in negotiations 
after seizure. This provision, like the others of the
7 3 Laws"of Hew Jersey, 1946, o. 38 as amended Laws of 1947, o. 47, sec. 4.
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amendment* was aimed directly at certain defects in the aot 
which became apparent after the procedure had been in 
operation for a year* .
The amendment to the earlier New Jersey aot also pro­
vided for a system of fines and penalties which were lacking 
in the original statute. Any organization which violates 
the aot is subject to a fine of #10*000 per day for eaoh day 
of service stoppage.7® Any individual who violates the aot 
or aids or gives guidance to violations of the act* is guilty 
of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of not less than #250 
nor more than #500 or imprisonment for thirty days or both.77 
The New Jersey statute was further amended at a later date 
and the provisions for imprisonment taken out of the law.78
The Missouri statute also imposes fines and penalties 
for violation of the aot. The penalties imposed upon labor 
for violation of the statute are more severe than those 
under the New Jersey statute. Any employee who strikes 
against the utility in violation of the aot loses all rights 
as an employee of the utility and can be rehired only as a 
new employee. Any labor organization that violates the act 
is fined #10*000 a day for each day of work stoppage, 
payable to the State Publio Sohool Fund. Any officer of a
78 Laws of New Jersey, 1946* o. 38, as amended Laws of 1947, c. 47, sec. 8.
77 Ibid., sec. 9.
78 Laws of New Jersey* 1946* o. 38* as amended Laws of 1947, o. 47* as amended o. 75, seo. 8.
labor union who partiolpatee In calling, inciting or support­
ing a strike is fined #1,000 payable to the Public School 
lUnd,
Likewise, the penalties on management for violation 
of the. statute .are also more severe.than those found in the 
Hew Jersey aot. & utility which engages In a lockout Is 
fined tio, 000 a day for each day of the lockout, payable to 
the public School Fund. Further, should the State Board of 
Mediation find that the utility has failed to bargain in 
good faith, the State Board certifies such finding, along 
with the record of any proceedings that support it, to the 
Public Service Commission of the state. If the public Service 
Commission sustains the contention that the utility has 
failed to bargain in good faith, it may revoke the certificate 
of convenience and necessity of the utility or impose any 
other penalties on the utility that are provided by law.79
The large fines plus the possible loss of employee 
rights for labor and the possible loss of the certificate of 
convenience and. necessity for the utility are the strongest 
penalties found in any of the ten laws.
The Massachusetts and Virginia statutes, which follow 
the Sew Jersey pattern, vary somewhat from the Sew Jersey - 
Missouri previsions. They both cad in state seizure but 
require no compulsory arfeltratloa. They are & distinct and
— W T s i i ~ o f  Missouri, 1947, H. B. 180, sec. 21.
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separate application of the state seizure pattern of approach.
Whenever the Commissioner of Labor ana Industries of 
Massachusetts finds that a labor dispute has not been settled 
by collective bargaining and may threaten an Interruption of 
service* he "certifies" such dispute to the Governor. The 
Governor then Investigates and, If he finds an interruption 
of service may be threatened, proclaims that such interrup­
tion would endanger the health or safety of the community. 
After the proclamation, the Governor is authorized to invoke 
several steps In an effort to settle the dispute.®0
The Governor may require the parties to the dispute 
to appear before a moderator and show cause, why they should 
not submit the dispute to voluntary arbitration. If no 
agreement on arbitration has been reaehed after a period of 
fifteen days, the findings of the moderator are. published, in 
the hope that the pressure of publio opinion would bring a 
settlement to the dispute.®
As an alternative to the prooedure described in the 
preceding paragraph, the Governor may “request" the parties 
to arbitrate the dispute before a three-man Emergency Board 
of Arbitration. One of these three is to represent Industry, 
one to represent labor and the third to represent the general 
public. The Emergency Board is required to hold its hearings,
66 Laws”bf Massachusetts, 194?, o. 596, see. 5.
81 Ibid., sec. 3(A).
make and file a report with the Governor within thirty days. 
Burlng this time there shall he no change In the conditions 
of labor nor any Interruption of service.92 it is well to 
note that the Governor has the power only to “request* that 
the parties; arbitrate .the dispute before this Board.
Should either of these attempts fail to secure a 
settlement of the dispute* or should the dispute he of such 
nature that the above procedures cannot apply, the Governor, 
if he finds that interruption of service would endanger the 
health or safety of the community, is empowered to declare 
that an emergency exists.^3 During the emergency the 
Governor is authorised to use one of two procedures to pro­
tect the people of the commonwealth.
First* the Governor may enter into arrangement# with 
either or both parties to the dispute for continuing the 
production and distribution of the goods or services in 
question. The Governor ha# the power to prescribe rules and 
regulations to put these arrangements into force and to see 
that there is no interference with the arrangements.^ In 
other words, the Governor may attempt to get either side to 
the dispute to give up Its Idea of a strike or lockout in 
favor of continued operation of the plant for the public 
good.
~.... 82 baws of Massachusetts, 1947, e. -596* sec. 3(B).
83 Ibid., sec. 4,(&).
84 Ibid., sec. 4,£#)<&).
The other alternative to this voluntary agreement 
procedure ie for the Governor to seize the plant. The 
Governor may designate any agency or department of the common­
wealth to operate the plant and may lay down any rules and 
regulations necessary for state operation. The plant or 
facility may he operated for the account of the persons 
operating it Immediately prior to seizure or such persons 
may waive all claims to the proceeds of the operation in 
favor of a court-determined compensatory payment for the use 
of the property* If the owners of the seised plant wish to 
waive any claim to the proceeds of state operation* they must 
file written notice with the Governor within ten days after
seizure. 85
During seizure the rates of pay and conditions of 
labor remain the same unless the Governor wishes to make the 
changes that were reoommended by the Emergency Board of Arbi­
tration. If no Emergency Board had been appointed in the 
procedure before seizure* the Governor may appoint suoh a 
Board to make recommendations on wage rates and conditions 
of labor for the period of state operation. These recom­
mendations may be put into effect at the discretion of the 
Governor.8®
35 Laws of Massachusetts* 1947, c. 596* seo. 4* 
(a)(B)(l).
66 Ibid.* sec. 4,(a)(B)(2).
During the emergency it is unlawful for any person 
or persons- to engage in. a cessation of work or to interfere 
with the operation of the plant when operated hy the common­
wealth. 'f&%$ applies to direction or guidance of work . 
storages as well .87
■The seizure is ended whenever the parties to the 
dispute jointly notify the Governor that they have executed 
an agreement or whenever the governor deems that intervention 
is no longer necessary to safeguard the public, even though
i . . .
no settlement has been reached,^
*Sie Massachusetts statute does not lay down f ines or 
penalties for violation of the act. father,., it grants the', 
commonwealth the power to go to court and s e c u r e  injunctions 
against illegal action and it gives the courts the responsi­
bility of enforcing the provisions of the statute,^
It is interesting to note that the Massachusetts act 
does -not provide for compulsion in any. of its provisions, 
neither 'does it provide any procedure for settlement after 
the commonwealth has seised the plant in order to prevent 
service stoppages.'
the other statute that follows the Sew Jersey pattern 
of state seizure: but Which, does not provide for compulsory
87 baws'of Massachusetts, 1947, c. 596, sec. 4,(b).
68 ibid,, sec, 4,ioK&)•
89 Ibid,, sec. 5.
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arbitration is that of Virginia. The Virginia statute Is 
peculiar in that it does not prohibit strikes as such. It 
is distinct in its approach to the problem in this respect.
In the'place of any prohibition of strikes, a procedure 
based on voluntary aotlon and ending In governmental seizure 
is provided.
Before either'party can engage in a strike or lockout, 
it must oomply to the four basic steps of the procedure, The 
first of the four steps has been noted a b o v e . T h a t  is, 
whenever either party desires a change in contract it must 
file written notice with the other party and the Governor.
The notice must give specific details of the proposed change, 
set a time within sixty days and a place at which representa­
tives of both parties will meet and hold a conference to 
negotiate the ohanges in the contract. The so-called 9 first 
conference0 continues until both parties agree that there is 
no further use in bargaining. At the adjournment of the 
first conference, a date for the second conference Is set and 
the Governor notified of the continued disagreement.91
The next step is the 0second conference'* which must 
take place within ten days of the adjournment of the first 
conference. It is recognized that the seoond conference is 
of a more serious nature than the first. The Governor may
Go dee p. 56 ff.
91 Aots of Assembly (Virginia), 1947, c. 9, seo. 4,(a).
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attend the second conference or .he may send a personal 
representative In an attempt to exert effort in "behalf of 
settlement.
The second conference continues until either party 
feels that further negotiation would be fruitless. Upon 
notification of the other party and the Governor that one 
party is unwilling to continue negotiations* the conference 
is adjourned,99
The third step comes when the Governor receives notice 
that the conference has ended. Upon receipt of such notice# 
it Is his duty to request both parties to submit the dispute 
to arbitration.93 This Is a purely voluntary arbitration 
and the Governor can only *request* both parties to arbitrate.
Should the parties refuse the request of voluntary 
arbitration, then a strike or lockout is permitted. However# 
the party that decides to engage in strike or lockout must# 
by law* file a copy of its intentions* naming a date not less 
than five weeks In the future that such strike or lookout 
will take place.94 This provides a ■ cooling off* period as 
well as time for the Governor to investigate and take action 
as prescribed by the aot.
After the declaration of intent and naming of a date
9& Aots of Assembly (Virginia), 1947, o. 9, sec. 4(b).
95 Ibid., seo. 4(c).
94 Ibid., sec. 4(b).
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for the strike or lockout to take place# the Governor then 
; Investigates the proposed work stoppage. If he concludes 
that the stoppage will ^constitute a serious threat to the 
public health, safety or welfare* he may issue a proclamation 
declaring that he will take possession of the plant or 
facility at the time of such stoppage.95
After the proclamation of intent to seise the plant 
or facility# the Governor * s next step is to decide which 
employees cr positions of employment are essential to the 
continuity of service. Deciding this# he is to poll the 
workers on these jobs to see if they will work for the state. 
Any persons wishing to stay at their Jobs may do so. Manage­
ment is required to furnish the Governor information as to 
which positions are essential and the names of the persons 
holding these positions.96 The status of the employee is 
not to be affected by either his acceptance or refusal to 
work for the state.9?
If the workers# collectively or individually# decide 
not to work for the state# then the Governor must Institute 
measures to secure and train persons to fill the vacancies. 
The Governor and/or his agents have the power to enter the
- Vi
property of the utility, familiarise themselves with the
96 Acts of Assembly (Virginia)# 1947, c. 9# sec. 4(b).
96 Ibid., seo. 7.
97 Ibid., sec. 11.
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, '* '
nature -of' the work and bring the prospective replacements 
onto the property for training.98 It Is absolutely unlawful 
for any person or organization to Interfere With this train­
ing prooess in any manner. Picketing is especially forbidden."
The expenses of such training are to be paid from 
state funds and are to be recouped from operation of the 
utility by the state. In oase of a settlement of the dispute 
while the training is going on and before the Governor takes 
possession of the plant, the utility must reimburse the state 
treasury for the expenses of training.1"
i
If the dispute has not been settled by the end of the 
five-weeks period, the strike or lockout occurs. The two 
conferences and the five weeks allowed for training and 
preparation for seizure set up an extended cooling off 
period. The minimum time that a strike could occur from the 
time of the filing of the proposed changes is forty-five 
days; that Is, there must be ten days between conferences 
and a thirty-five day cooling off period. The law was 
designed with the hope that this long cooling off period
iwould promote voluntary settlement of the dispute.
When the strike or lookout occurs, the Governor takes 
over the plant or facility. While the plant Is under
! £8 Acts of Assembly (Virginia^ 1947, c. 9, sec. 8.
99 Ibid., see. 9.
100 Ibid.*, secs; 10, 12 -a.
70
governmental operation there is to be no change in the rates 
of pay or working conditions of the employees.101
A novel provision in the Virginia statute is that the 
state imposes a IS per cent service charge on the utility 
during state operation. That is* during the period of state 
operation,' the Governor oolleote the gross revenue and pays 
all expenses; however, he remits only 85,per cent of the net 
income to the utility. The remaining 15 per oent is usea to 
cover state expenses of operation and to train replacements 
for the workers who left their Jobs.
The apparent intent of these last two items is to 
speed settlement of the dispute after state seizure. That 
is, during seizure no change can be made in wages or con­
ditions of employment, thus labor is stalemated in its hopes 
for wage Increases or ohanged conditions. Likewise, manage-, 
ment loses a share of the profits of the operation, thus 
providing It with an incentive to settle the dispute.
The property is restored to its owners when the 
representatives of the owners notify the Governor in writing 
that the utility is in a position to resume normal operations. 
The Governor or his agent ascertains the correctness of such 
notification and, upon confirmation of the position of the
161 Acts of Assembly (Virginia), 1947, o. 9, sec. 11.
102 Ibid., sec. 12.
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CHAPTER VI
APPLICATION OF ANTI-STRIKE LEGISLATION
Although these ten anti-strike laws have been on the 
statute books of the various states for several years, they 
have been used Infrequently. However, oases where the laws 
have been used present an Interesting picture of attempts 
to deal with a speoifio problem, through the medium of state 
legislation.
Since the New Jersey statute is oldest in point of 
time, most of the significant cases of application have 
arisen under it. It is here that the whole type of legis­
lation, generally, has stood the tests of court aotlon and 
the tests of practical application. That is not to say, 
however, that the other acts have not been applied and in 
many oases brought interesting results from their applica­
tion. But since it is under the New Jersey aot that most 
of the experience with the application of this type of 
legislation has oocurred, it is in this area that the dis­
cussion of application of these statutes shall be centered.
In writing of the original New Jersey 1946 aot, Dr. 
Lois MacDonald of New fork University observed:
. . . the statute was not so rigorous as had been proposed originally in the Senate bill.
Neither w a B  it so comprehensive as might have been expected in the light of the broad reoom- mendatlons made by the Governor .. A
1 Lois MacDonald, Compulsory Arbitration in New 
Jersey.(New York University: New York, 194&), p.~T3.
there was m  penalty for refusal to abide by the terns of 
the aot. ■ Striking as such was not made 'illegal* even'after 
state-seizure, the statute relied'upon the force of public 
opinion to induce the parties to the dispute to accept the 
recommendations of the Public Hearing Panel and to.refrain 
from striking' while the utility was .being operated by the 
State..'-:-;: "
Between April 6, 1946, when the original act became 
effective, and April 7, 1947, when the first amendment was 
added, there were seven labor disputes that case before the 
New Jersey State Board of Mediation. Pour -of these involved 
local transportation but the lines-were'not seised on the 
grounds 'that competing facilities were .available to the 
.consumers. ""These disputes, were- all' Settled in a short time 
with a Public Hearing Panel; being established in one .case 
only. The other three labor disputes In that early period 
were in gas plants. Seizure took place in all three cases 
and settlement came about through the use of the Public 
Hearing Panel.2
Seizure was carried on under the provision of the aot 
that allowed the governor to take immediate possession of 
the plant whenever a strike or lockout took place that would
• i;v'j: B ilaoponald, Compulsory Arbitration . . op. clt.,pp. 16-17, citing Allen 'Welsenfeld,' "Arbitrating labor disputes"in Hew Jersey,* (unpublished manuscript), Mr. 
Weisenfeld served as Secretary of the State Board of 
Mediation during this period.
threaten th# public Interest, health or welfare whether 
notice of proposed changes in contract or other procedural 
steps had been taken or not.^
fhe labor difficulties in 1946 came to a climax on 
GhrietmaS©re when gas plant workers walked off their Jobs 
in ■ the • dersey City' and ■ Piscataway area.'■ Within a ■ short- 
time these workers were Joined by gas workers in the other 
plants of the PUbli© Service Sleotrlc and Gas, Company who 
felt they were being used as strike-breakers sin©# all the 
plants were interconnected.4 the state officials seem to 
have been ’©aught unprepared by these quick strikes. Seizure 
was effected after the walkout and supervisory employees 
kept the gas in the lines. An agreement was finally reached 
and the plants released from state seizure.^
The flaw# in the law beo&me apparent, There was 
Speculation that the action of these three gas strikes had 
proved the liew dersey act ineffective as a method of dealing 
with service stoppages,g Us# lesson learned from those 
strike# was that the state must be ready to seize the plants
3 iaws of lew Jersey, 1946, o. 38, sec. 13. ■
4 *Gas Strike,* Public Utilities Fortnightly, 39M25, January 16, 1947.
5 ^orders Gas plants Returned,® Publio utilities Fortnightly, 39:067, February 13, 1947.
6 flTbe law that Failed,* Business leek, January 4, 1947, p. 58. ■ ' - ■ !
before the strike date and that' striking after seizure must 
be prohibited* fhe amendments In- April.attempted to correct 
these weaknesses in the law.
As .governor Walter- f. ISge retired from offioe in 
January* 1947, he recommended that the few* Jersey anti-strike
law be re-written. Ee asked that * teeth*1 beput into the
< flaw; specifically, compulsory arbitration after seizure and 
prohibition'of strikes against the. state after seizure. 
Governor frlseoll, his successor,' also requested "sanctions* .7 
Although the requests of the Governors began legislative 
committee aetton investigating 'tkeworklhgs of the act* it 
;took more than a speech' or a ̂ request" to Start' revision of 
the law.
' fhb telephone strike- in April, 1947, started action 
for the revision of the act. The Christmas gas strikes had 
pointed out the weaknesses of the law but it was the April 
telephone strikes that stirred the M m  Jersey legislature 
into action, the dispute, between the independent fraffio 
telephone Workers Federation of M m  Jersey and the Hew 
Jersey Bell telephone Company, was part of the nationwide 
telephone strike of 1947. prior" to the aspiration of the 
contract between the parties on March 31, 1947, negotiations 
had failed to produce any agreement on new wages, hours and
-if j0nn hassett, "ftillty labor fills' in'state 
Capitols,* Public Utilities fortnightly, 39:277, February 27, 1947. ***
eon&ittoas of employment. On April 7 the union called a 
strike, fhe hurried action that followed hag been described 
in this manner:
. . . bn April 7, 194*?, the Union called a 'Strike 
and engaged in peaceful picketing of the buildings 
of the company. ! hater that same day; Governor 
Driscoll seized the facilities in accordance with 
the term® ofthe statute, which at .that date - did'.
not proscribe strikes or picketing of struck plants .. * • ' ,
bn the following day, April 8, the state legis­
lature enacted an amended bill within a few hours 
af ter the introduction, there were no public hearlnge and apparently there was little debate 
on the measure, fhe Governor signed the bill on April 9, and the new law became effective as of 
that date. .
fhe amended statute mad® it unlawful for persons to 
engage in any strike or work stoppage against the state, 
after seizure or-bo refuse to work for the state. in 
addition, compulsory arbitration within ten days after state 
seizure and penalties for violation of the act were provided.® 
- fhe new terms of the statute were Immediately applied, 
foken arrests were mad# and the Attorney General of lew Jersey 
entered suit against the union to recover the #10,000 fine 
for the single day of violation.-' a  court 'battle to stop 
enforcement and to test the cons titut tonality of the statute 
was begun.
' ^'^'aopohald, Qompulsory Arbitration , . ., jp. clt.* 
pp. 17-18.
9 gee pp. 58 ff.
10 fi Strike laws feated,# business Week, April 19, 
1947, p. 1 OS.
7?
On April 22, 1947, the day before the hearing in 
federal court on an injunction to stop the enforcement of 
the penalties, the legislature again amended the statute, 
fhe criminal penalties and Imprisonment for violation of the 
aot were removed and fines were substituted instead.11
A long legal battle followed, fhe Attorney General of 
Me?; Jersey appeared before the Court of Chanoery and sought 
an injunction restraining his offioe from enforcing the 
statute pending a decision on its constitutionality. On the 
basis of this petition, appeal before the Federal Court was 
dissolved,3-2 and the issue of constitutionality of the 
statute went into the state courts. In addition, further 
appeal by the union to the Supreme Court of the United States 
was denied.
fhe oase was argued before the Court of Chanoery with 
both the company and the union challenging the validity of 
the statute. Dr. MacDonald, quoting from the briefs filed 
with the Chancery Court, summarises the arguments presented 
by both sides:
11 Laws-of Mew Jersey, 1946, o. 38, as amended Laws 
of 1947, o. 47 as amended o. 75, sec. 8.
12 Traffic Telephone Workers Federation v. Driscoll,72 F. SuppT ---------------------- ---------
13 Traffic Telephone Workers Federation v. Driscoll, 332 U. S. 833T"88 gup.‘Ct. 2X2 (194777
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. . . The Company based its arguments on two main contentions: (1) seizure is unconstitutionalbecause it provides no-compensation; and (2) the compulsory arbitration sections are unconstitutional because they delegate legislative power to an 
administrative agency without providing adequate standards.
The union’s ohief arguments were: {1} oois£>uleoryarbitration deprives members of the equal protection of the laws, impairs liberty of contract, and imposes Involuntary servitude; (2) the strike prohibition, with its consequent effect on picketing is a deprivate of constitutional rights, creating a type of second-class citizenship for publio utility workers; and (3) the statute forbids employees acting in concert in a manner lawful for an individual . . .^
On September 10, 1948, the oourt sustained the consti­
tutionality of the statute15 and appeal was taken to the 
Hew Jersey Supreme Court on substantially the same grounds 
as noted above.
The Hew Jersey Supreme Court set down its decision on 
Hay 26, 1949, over two years after the legal action was 
started. The Supreme Court sustained the statute on all 
grounds except the lack of standards for the guidance of the 
Board of Arbitration. In the absence of suoh provisions, the 
power to set wages and working conditions was held to be an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.
14 uacbonald. Compulsory Arbitration . . ., op. oit., 
pp. 22-23, quoting from briefs filed In State v. Traffic Telephone Workers Federation of Hew Jersey. In Chancery of 
Sew Jersey, Docket 158, April 16, 1948.
15 State v. Traffic Telephone Workers Federation of New JereeyTTTAfl TSriar37C"CmS)7-------------------
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Discussing this issue, Chief Justice Vanderbilt stated in 
part:
. . . Delegation of legislative authority must always prescribe standards that are to govern the administrative agency in the exercise of the powers thus delegated to it.
If no standards are set up to guide the adminis­trative agenoy, the legislation is void as passing 
beyond the legitimate bounds of delegation of legis­lative power as constituting the surrender and 
abdication to an alien body of a power which the constitution oonfers on the Senate and the General Assembly alone . • •
The personnel of the board of arbitration under the statute will vary with each strike. There is 
no permanence or continuity in the various boards of arbitration which may be constituted in successive 
oases. There is, thus, an even greater need for specific standards than there would be in the oase of a continuous administrative tody which might gather experience as it went along . • . Unlessstandards are set up In any submission to arbitrationthe tendenoy to compromise and be guided in part by expediency as distinguished frost objective considera­tion and real right is Inevitable • • .1®
With this oritioism in mind, the Hew Jersey legisla­
ture again undertook to ohange the basic 1946 statute. The 
legislature set up standards for the arbitration board to 
follow and restricted its decisions to certain matters. Ho
other part of the aot was revised. Under the revision:
. . . the board shall not render findings of fact, decision or order upon any issue or issues which are not proper subjects for oolleotive bar­gaining for the reason that they do not pertain to wages, hours, or conditions of employment.
16 Hew Jersey v. Traffic Telephone Workers Federation, 
66 Atl (2ncTT~616 (194$).
Where ‘there is no contract between the parties* or where there is a contract hot t o  parties are negotiating a new contract or amendments to t o  existing' contract, and issues arise which are 'the subject of dispute between the parties to such negotiations, t o  boara shall make a Just and reasonable determination of the dispute, and in deterttining^such issue#,: base itaf ladings of fact, decision and order upon to..following factors;(1) the interest and welfare of " t o  public.
m )  Comparison of wages, hours and conditions of , employment of the employees Involved in t o  arbi­tration proceedings, and t o  wages, hours, and condition# of employment of employees doing the same, similar' or comparable work -or work requiring 
the same, similar or comparable skill# and expendi­tures of energy and effort, giving consideration to such factors a# are peculiar to t o  industry involved.
(3) Comparison of wages, hour© and conditions of employment as reflected in industries in general 
and in public Utilities in particular throughout the nation' and- the State of few Jersey.
(4) fhe security and tenure of employment with due regard for the effect of technological changes thereon as well as t o  effect of any unique skills and attributes developed in the industry.
(5) such other factors not confined to the fore­going which are normally or traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of wages, 
hour# and condition# of employment through■ .voluntary collective bargaining, arbitration or ^ otherwise between the parties or in t o  industry *1'
fhe revision was enacted J^ne 16, 1949, and t o  legis­
lator hoped t o t  by this final amendment t o  basic law of 
1S4S had now been changed in such a way as to stand the tost 
of constitutionality and still remain a workable solution to 
the problem. It is readily seen tot: sufficient standards 
were set up by the 1949 amendment*
1 m ^ a W " o f  M m  Jersey, 1946, o. 38; laws of 194*?, 
e. 4?; c. 75* as amended laws of 1949, e. 398, sec. 1.
Although th© law has been in the process of develop­
ment ©lace 1940, the usage of the statute ha© been extensive. 
Dr. MacDonald has compiled the following statistics m  usage 
of the law for the period from 1946 until March 1949: i?6
notices of change of contract have been received hr the state 
Board of Mediation? 106 of these were settled without jus© Of 
the law; of these> seventy cases where the board tooh Juris- '' 
diction, nearly half involved transportation, a quarter of 
the'.eases: involved disputes In the gas Industry, and the' 
remaining 25 per: cent being composed of telephone, commercial 
offices of public utilities, electric power and water 
companies in that order. Seventeen Public bearing Panels 
were set up, five of these Panels being successful in closing 
the cases; and eighteen Boards of Arbitration were appointed, 
eight as a result of state seizure and ten by voluntary 
stipulation, final awards were mad© by fourteen of these 
boards, the other cases being settled prior to the decisions 
of the arbitrators.^
fhe formal action of the statute was used in about 40
per cent of the total number of notices filed. Of the eases
1 -where the.procedure was used, about 11 per cent went the full 
course of the procedure to compulsory arbitration.
New Jersey has acted in the capacity of a epieaeer* in
18 MacDonald, Compulsory Arbitration . . ., pp. Pit
pp. 26-2?.
• I
this field and it is hep® that this type of legislative 
approach has been tested. It is here that the weaknesses of 
the acts have also appeared.
Saving a different approach to the problem in that it 
has no compulsory features, the Virginia statute also has an 
interesting background and application.
fhe 1940 Chesapeake Ferry strike was significant 
because it laid the precedent for future legislation. On 
February 8, 1946, the ferry crews, members of th© Seafarers 
International Union (AFL), struck for higher wages. At this 
time, there was no anti-strike law on the Virginia statute 
books. A special aot of the legislature was passed allowing
state seizure by the Highway Commission.^
fhe Ferry Company refused to surrender the property 
and took the case to court, fhe Court ruled that seizure was 
legal provided that •reasonable compensation be paid and the 
property be maintained in a similar order and condition*.20 
fhis was only the beginning of the Virginia troubles.
In the spring of 1946, the International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers Union and the Virginia Electric and Power 
Company had been negotiating several months for a new contract, 
fhe bargaining appeared stalemated and the Union served a 
strike notice in April, 1940. There was no legal tool to
w  T I9Aotsrof Assembly (Virginia), 1946, o. 39.
20 Anderson v. Chesapeake Ferry Company, 43 SI (2d) 10.
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prevent the strike and the two million people in sixty-three 
Virginia counties that would have been affected waited appre­
hensively for their lights to go out.21
At this point, Governor William 12. Tuck took action. 
Recalling an obscure law passed in the oolonlal days when 
Patrick Henry was Governor of Virginia that deolared every 
able-bodied man a member of the *unorganized militia*, the 
Governor proclaimed an emergency and "drafted* the 3600 
employees of Virginia Electrio and Power into the National 
Guard, fhe workers were furloughed to their jobs with the 
threat of oourt martial if they struck. Twenty-four hours 
before the strike deadline, the action was called off and the 
Governor Issued "honorable discharges* to the "recruits*.22 
Realising that the old law, good luck and a humorous 
situation would not prevent future strikes, Governor Tuck 
called for legislative aotion to deal with the problem. The 
Virginia Advisory Legislative Council undertook the study of 
a proposed law drawn up by the Attorney General. The end 
result was the Virginia statute discussed above.23
It will be recalled that the Virginia statute is 
peculiar in that It allows strikes, has no compulsion in its
21 "State Rights,* Business Week, April 6, 1946, p. 98.
22 James J. Kilpatrick, "Virginia Keeps her Public 
Utilities Running," Publlo Utilities Fortnightly, 44i843, 
December 22, 1949.
23 See pp. 65 ff.
procedure a M  ends in state seizure:, fhe law was e© written 
as ''io discourage strifes or lookouts by making it wary ’ 
expensive, both in terac ef money and in terms of benefits, 
to cause a':work stoppage. '■■-■•'-
- - ..fh# l#es'usage than the Sow
Jersey: aot. 'iso of December, 1949, eighty-five proceedings 
had- been filed under the' pot and only five had led’ to state 
astzure.^4-
fhe .first test of th© workability of the Virginia pet . • 
oamê  in the" spring of 194? in connection with- the nationwide . 
telephone-' Strike, fhe Chesapeake and Potomao f el ©phone r 
Gos^any and the Virginia Federation of felepfeone Workers 
negotiations broke-down in February and the first conference 
was. began.' By April, the Governor1# request for arbitration 
had been refused and a strike date set for Hay. i?th. Governor 
Tuck declared he would'seize the facilities, on that date and 
prepapatiolia for'seizure were begun. After several days' ■' 
hesitation>' the workers polled by the State Corporation 
Goiamission,: the Governor's appolnted agent to run the utility* 
showed that the 'workers would, continue on their lobs for the 
state-. Msewhere in the nation* long distance and local, 
lines were closed' because of strike. Only in Virginia -said 
Indiana did the lines stay open.^d
J"n;"'"2A Kilpatrick, *Virginia keeps . . op. cit., p. 847.
25 s t r i k e  h a w s  tested*s • Business Week* April 10, 1947, 
p. 102. ’ ~~
Of fit# fin# seizures, the on# above involved fhe siaie- 
.wid# Bell Company affiliate, one involved a small phone 
company and toe# involved local transportafion companies. 
jytX..of \th# seizures were executed without violence or 
recrimination#.
In -writing about the- operation: of the- Virginia law#:
' Up.- Kilpatrick states:
. . . ihcr© has been no predominant pattern for negotiation#. Many proceeding# have ended after satisfactory ^first conferences8 . Many others have resulted in settlement, of tea with- the' assistance ‘ of a representative of the Governor, during the second oenference phase. In perhaps IS cases, th# Governor has been required to ash the parties for arbitration of matters, in most instance#, the . utility-companies have refused and strike notice.#■. -.have been filed— bat disputes hav# been settled in the 35 day waiting period. So
Virginia seem# to approve of the law as a fair mean# 
of settling public utility labor disputes. It was considered 
a deciding factor in the 1949 gubernatorial campaign by on© 
writer.^ Editorial comment after the 194? phone strike was 
generally favorable with one newspaper going so far as to 
say mat..Virginia *®ay be pioneering in the field of labor 
relations as surely a# she biased a m m  trail for a fre© 
people in the first period of the American Revolution*.^
' ^ ^ ^ ‘"IB^IIpttriok, "Virginia Keeps . v  . pp. clt. p. 849.
27 Ibid., p. 950.,
28 i,l:First f##k of utilities Act** Richmond. Sews 
header, May 22, 194V.
Vance Julian, Chairman of Hie Missouri State Board of 
Mediation, has reviewed, the experience -of Missouri In operat­
ing under it® statute. He Indicated ■ that during the first 
nine months of operation, forty-six oases had been docketed,
/ . ' 1 ♦' . » « -i r  '  1 "
twenty of these oases were ,still pending at the time’ of the'- 
m,bleie. of the remaining twenty^aik oases, twelve. had 
ended by the- parties- reaching hew agreements on all issues 
before -theexpiration, date of 'Hie- oontract. In fen disputes,-- 
the parties had agreed la writing before the expiration date 
to continue negotiations and if newcontraots could not be 
reached, to use voluntary arbitration. Only one of the ten 
had not completed .voluntary arbitration by June, 1948. Three 
cases had gone on to compulsory public hearing panels. In 
two of these, the parties accepted Hie recommendations of the 
panel and in the third, the parties reached agreement after 
the hearing was concluded but before the panel submitted its 
recommendations. One case was settled while m  arbitration 
panel was being' set u p ^
According to Julian, questions of Jurisdi ction have 
presented.some problems of application, fhe Missouri act, 
calling for jurisdiction over ^transportation other than 
railroads8 led to the board1s ruling Hist ^companies engaged 
in long distance trucking* came within the definition of the
~W"Vano& Jul Ian, “How Missourif s Hew Utility Anti- Strike haw forks,8 public Utilities Fortnightly, 42:207, 
August 12, 1948.
law. the question of Jurisdiction over taxicab oompaniea, 
requestsd by the taxicab union, was poking decision of the 
attorney General at the time of the article. Jurisdiction 
was denied to a radio station and a ̂ bottled gas® company, 
when requested by the employees, a® not being utilities 
under the meaning of the act.30 1
Although the Missouri statute specifically covers all, 
utilities operating under governmental ownership and control, 
the Supreme Court of Missouri has held that the jurisdiction 
here is Illegal. fh& Court said «f)»der our form of govern­
ment, public of floe or- employment never has been and cannot 
become § matter of bargaining and con tract. *31
Information about the application of the statute®, in 
the other states attempting this approach Is scarce. Only 
in such instanoes as the nationwide telephone strike of 194? 
have the laws been given national publicity. Even this- event 
gives examples of application on a very limited scale due to 
the fact that a limited number of states had anti-strike 
legislation that .early in 194?. In fact, the very strike 
that called attention to the laws in effect at that time 
served to speed .legislation designed to deal with the 
continuity of service In other states.
" ^  Julian, “How Missouri1 e . . . ,n 0£» olt., p. 20?.
31 City of SorlnKfield V. Clous©, 20$ M  (2d) 539,M 5 <194? — ~ *—
as
In Michigan, the statute was held unconstitutional In 
1948 because of the peculiar provision that a oirouit judge 
aot as chairman of the Board of Mediation.3^ on June 1, 1949, 
the law was revised and modified, making it constitutional.33
Mich court action has come as a result of jurisdic­
tional questions in the application of the Wisconsin aot.
The Jurisdiction of the act has been upheld where the federal 
government and federal legislation does not apply.34 The 
statute has been amended so that It includes in its juris­
diction electric light and power cooperatives,33 and this 
feature of the aot has been held to be constitutional also.3®
Since It was passed before the nationwide telephone 
strike of 1947, the Indiana statute had important application 
in dealing with this dispute. When the phone lines were 
closed down elsewhere in the country, Indiana and Virginia 
lines stayed open. The National Federation of Telephone
52 Local 170, Transport Workers of America v. G-odala, 
322 Mich 332; 34 Nff (2d) 71, 77.
33 "Modified Labor Law Signed,« Public Utilities 
Fortnightly, 44:882, June 23, 1949.
34 IBEW Local B-953 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Board, 30 W j 2 W ^ l ^
35 "Cooperative under Anti-strike Law," Public Utilities Fortnightly, 43:45, March 31, 1949.
36 M. L. Friedman, "Compulsory, Arbitration of Labor 
Disputes in the Public Utilities," G-eorge Washington Law Review, 17:370, April 1949, quoting"""state of, Wlsoonsin ex. rel., Palryiand Power Cooperative v. Wisconsin Bmploymont 
ffeTat ion iBoar5,~^~i;. R . C T . ^ g I T l 9 W : ----“ ----
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Workers ordered their Indiana locals not to go on strike. 
Actually no Impasse was ever reached so that the procedures 
were never invoked.3?
Indiana*s Governor Gates olalmed this as positive 
proof of the workability of the statute. However, Business
Week adds, as an after-thought to this claim:
\
. . • Most likely, neither management nor the union in Indiana was willing to have looal issues go to arbitration; both preferred to follow a pattern set on national bargaining levels. Had the dispute involved only Indiana, the situation might have had a different twist.38
Even though the statutes have been applied infrequently, 
the application does show two things. First, application 
shows certain flaws In the statutes and in the general 
philosophy behind the acts, whioh will be discussed in the 
next chapter; and seoond, application shows that approach to 
the problem on the state legislative, private ownership level 
Is possible and presents one possible approach to the problem 
of continued service.
In conclusion, the two basic approaches to the problem 
of continued service, the ownership approach and the legis­
lative approach, seem to end with approximately the same 
result. That is, when either governmental ownership or 
private ownership with legislative procedures Is used to 
solve the problem, the end result is generally compulsory
37 HStrike Laws Tested,” Business Week, April 19,
1947, p. 102.
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. 'Since th© ten statutes considered here have been in : 
use, for only a, short period, It is aifficnlt' to draw any 
oonotmotoiis • a# to the effects of this: type of legislation..
$Cf. only is information concerning application of the laws . 
sonfee hot opinion an Co the ®ffeottren&ss of the statutes 
In accomplishing their ChSsetiyee 'is hard to find, fo many 
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paign question in many states .and the appointments b# the 
mediation end arbitration boards' hare been made with a. view 
to the political advantage. Farther, the Gorernor i© usually 
.Charged with administration of th# statutes and this also 
opens the way for charges of politios.
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results of the .cancas# were disappointing, ©ter on® hundred 
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:©f the inquiries sent to labor leaders and labor organizations, 
' 08 per cent were returned, -if the questionnaires sent to
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“club* put forth and passed by •enemies* of organized labor* 
Organized labor in Missouri has been especially aotive in 
attempts to get the legislation repealed, including repeal 
of the statute, in a six-point program adopted by a meeting 
of the labor leaders representing every segment of organized 
labor in 1949.3
Labor's opposition to the legislation has been 
general. Ihat is, the fight for repeal in nearly every state 
has been lead by labor. Only in Illinois was the.campaign 
successful in defeating the initial legislation.^
It ie interesting to note that only in those states 
where compulsion is not used, Massachusetts and Virginia, 
were there any labor organisations that felt the statutes 
were satisfactory. These unions, generally centered in 
Massachusetts, made up only 6 per cent of the returns.
As an approach to the problem of oontinued service, 
over 68 per cent of the labor organizations replied that no
S Since some of the organizations and Individuals who answered questionnaires wish to remain anonymous, no names will be used here. Geographic locations, however, are useful in that some of the statutes differ In their approach of the problem.
3 “Vote to Oppose Ban on Strikes,* Public Utilities Fortnightly, 39:256, February 17, 1947.
4 "Illinois Labor Wins,* Public utilities Fortnightly, 39:798, June 5, 1947; *Senate Passes Strike Law1 Over Labor Compromise Bill,* ^ b ^  ,Utilities £ortnightly, 39:666, June 19, 1947; and “Bucks Anti-Strike Law,* Public Utilities Fort­
nightly, 39:256, February 16, 1947..
regulation at all (some substituting the phrase #free 
collective bargaining#) was the best approach.
Since strikes are absolutely forbidden in all of the 
statutes except Virginia, labor is giving up one of its strong-: 
est weapons. It is only natural that the unions and labor 
leaders would oppose this type of legislation. Only where 
the unions are given adequate compensation by gaining other 
issues would one expect to find labor approval of the loss 
of the traditionally powerful and necessary weapon, the 
strike. Very few states have given additional weapons to 
labor in substitution for the loss of the right to strike.
Management, on the other hand, is split in its opinion 
of the statutes. In fact, SO per cent of the utilities 
replied that the laws are unsatisfactory and 50 per cent 
replied that they are satisfactory* However, when asked what 
approach they favored to the problem of continued service, 
over 66 per oent indicated a preference for anti-strike 
legislation.
Dr. MacDonald found that in Mew Jersey neither labor 
nor management favored the law. Claiming that the law 
operated to the advantage of the other, both sides felt that 
the law was unfair and one-sided.5
The major objection of management seems to be the idea
5 Lois MaoDonald, Compulsory Arbitration in Mew Jersey, 
(New York University: Mew York), 1949, p. 60.
96
of having contract provisions set by arbitration boards made
up of persons unfamiliar with the conditions in the industry.
For example, one Indiana utility manager commented'on the
questionnaires
. . the arbitrators usually are lawyers, 
preachers, priests, sohool teachers and others who as a rule have no knowledge of problems involved and who generally aot on the basis of emotion rather than fact.
Any statutes introducing methods of dealing with labor
disputes which differ markedly from the customary pattern
are bound to oreate sharp attitudes and differences of
opinion*
The attitude of the public towards this type of legis­
lation is difficult to find. Since the public la primarily 
concerned with continuity of service, they probably favor 
these laws. Articles about the. Missouri and Virginia laws 
Indicate that the public is pleased with the effects of the 
legislation.® James Kilpatrick, editorial writer for a 
Richmond paper, claims that Virginians are pleased with the 
operation of the Virginia statute. Various editorial com­
ments from Virginia (furnished mostly by management) seem to 
indicate approval. However, it should be noted that the
information on this point Is scarce and that all available
> * »
" 6 Vance Julian, ttHow Missouri’s Hew Anti-Strike LawWorks." Public Utilities Fortnightly, 42s210, August 12, 1948, 
and James "*!'• Kilpatrick, ■’’Virginia' Keeps Its Public Utilities Running,* Public Utilities Fortnightly, 44:850, December 22, 
1949.
comment indicating the public approval generally case from 
the management side of the question. Further, the laws do 
not arouse public attention unless they are actively used to 
bring about settlement. Sinoe many of the statutes are 
designed to prevent strikes. and work; stoppages by making it 
too ^expensive* for either side to do anything bat follow 
.the procedure of the.statute, the attention of the public is 
not centered on the working# of the act#.
Ihe statute# have had a deoided effect on collective 
bargaining, la general* the compulsory arbitration features 
of the .statute# have tended to replace the collective bar­
gaining process. In other words, because a compulsory 
settlement, i# the end result' in most disputes, both parties . 
look to this arbitration when placing their offers and 
demands: and in arguing their case#.- ■
Both side# set their goals as high a# possible and 
■refuse to compromise or bargain since they realize that in. 
the end they can force the issue to a decision before a 
board of arbitration. Since these boards have a tendency to 
compromise the issues in question,, it is expedient policy for 
each side to enter arbitration with the highest demand# or 
lowest offers possible.
fhe tendency to compromise generally does not satisfy 
either party. In answering the questionnaire, over ?3 per 
cent of the labor- organization# replied that the law# have
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benefltted them rarely In regard to wages, hours, and working 
conditions. The same groups that found the laws satisfactory 
replied that the statutes have benefItted them greatly.
Nearly 14 per cent gave no answer and 6 per cent replied the 
statutes have benefitted them *at times*.
A majority of the utilities, 58 per cent, indicated 
that the statutes have benefltted them rarely, while more 
than 8 per cent replied that they have been benefltted 
greatly. However, 33 per cent of the utilities felt that they 
have been benefltted at,times, which follows the indication 
that half the utilities found the statutes satisfactory.
In addition, there is a tendency for the basic issues 
of the dispute to remain obscured by a multitude of demands 
and charges. In hopes of making a better settlement, eaoh 
side is not adverse to presenting every conceivable type of 
demand. Dr. MacDonald quotes one publlo member of a New 
Jersey Board as saying, “they come with everything including 
the kitohen sink, properly dressed up* Although both sides 
probably intend to withdraw a number of their demands, the 
multitude of demand tends to confuse the real issue that has 
caused the dispute and puts an extra burden on the arbitrators.
Bath sides feel that the arbitration decisions have 
been unfavorable to their cause. Over 53 per cent of the 
labor organizations answered that the arbitration decisions
7 MacDonald, Compulsory Arbitration . . ., op. olt.,
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were generally unfavorable to labor, with only 6 per oent 
feeling that arbitration deciaions favored labor* (This 
latter answer came from the same groups that had a favor­
able opinion of the statutes in general.) Twenty per eent 
answered that the arbitration decisions generally favored 
neither side and 20 per cent held no opinion on this 
question. The utilities held similar views with over 49 per 
oent answering that the decisions have been unfavorable to 
management and 8 per cent answering that the deolslons have 
clearly favored their cause. Thirty-three per oent answered 
that the deciaions have favored neither side and over 16 per 
cent gave no answer. In reply to the question regarding wage 
increases that was put to the utilities, over 41 per oent 
answered that wages have been inoreased without justification 
by arbitration, (the same 41 per cent that felt that the 
decisions were unfavorable to management), over 153 per cent 
answered that the deoiaions have had no effect on wages and 
25 per cent had no opinion.
There seems to be a tendency for the parties to 
attempt to fulfill the conditions of the procedures in as 
short a time as possible so that the arbitration proceedings 
may begin. In doing this, opportunities for settlement of 
the dispute and traditional bargaining is by-passed in the 
haste.
As further evidenoe that compulsory arbitration tends
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to replace free collective 'bargaining, comments on the 
questionnaires mentioned that a "poor atmosphere* prevailed 
when the laws were used. One utility in Hew jersey noted:
To illustrate how compulsory arbitration tends to negate the principle of free collective bargain­ing, Counsel for the union representing the switch­board operators In Hew jersey stated during hearings in the traffic dispute that the union representing our plant department employees proposed to proceed to arbitration under the State statute In duly 1950 when their current contract expires. This state­ment preceded by several weeks the mating of demands by either party. Obviously, free collective bargain­ing cannot flourish in that sort of atmosphere, neither party will make any real concessions for the simple reason that any company concession* would be used by the unions as a "floor" in arbitration pro­ceedings and any union concessions would be used by the company as a "ceiling*.
It was the opinion of several persons who sent 
comments on the workings of the statutes that with the 
tendency to compromise the issues by the arbitration boards, 
the disputes were never actually settled, Arbitration 
merely served to postpone the strikes and work stoppages but 
did not settle the basic issue in dispute. Dr. MacDonald 
also found this to be true,8
Beoause of the desire of both parties to proceed to 
arbitration as quickly as possible, there is a tendency for 
each party to accuse the other of "stalling* and "playing 
politics*. This tends to create ill will and certainly does 
not produce an atmosphere conducive to free bargaining.
'-----  B MacDonald, Compulsory Arbitration . . ., p£. qlt«,
p . 60.
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On© possible effect of this type of legislation la 
that it would increase the membership of the union because 
It forces the utilities to recognize and bargain with their 
employees. However, the opposite could be the effect of the 
laws too because the law takes away the powerful right to 
strike, foroes the utilities to deal with the members, and 
in some cases guarantees the workers the right to their Jobs 
during labor difficulties. Since the workere might see no 
further need for a union, some locals might lose membership.
In attempting to answer this question, it was found 
from tiie Incomplete returns on the labor questionnaires that 
in only 20 per cent of the organizations was there any loss
Vin membership. However, in only slightly over 6 per oent of 
the organizations was there any inorease in membership.
These locale were the same group that had shown approval of 
the laws In general, perhaps being a significant reason for 
this approval. Over 46 per cent of the replies indicated no 
change in membership and over 28 per cent failed to answer 
this question. Therefore, it would seem that the laws have
• ihad very little over-all effect on union strength.
When asked if the laws had affooted their relation­
ship with the employers, over 73 per oent of the unions 
answered that relations with management have been worsened. 
Again the same 6 per oent answered that relations have 
improved while 20 per oent answered that the laws have had
m  effect on their relatione with management. However, SO 
per cent of th® utilities were of the opinion that the law® - 
have not affected their relatione with the workers, fwenty- 
flve . per cent answered that relatione with the workers have 
been, worsened by the laws and over. Id per cent felt that, 
employer-employee relatione have 'been improved.
' the effect on -the bargaining positions of the part lea 
to disputes followed the same pattern, fhe majority (80 per 
cent)"of the unions indicated that the laws have had a detri­
mental effect on -their bargaining position, the same 6 per 
cent answered that their bargaining: position, has been improved, 
and over 13- per cent replied that the laws have not affected 
the bargaining position. Again, 50 per cent of the utilities 
indicated .that the laws have .had a detrimental effect on 
their bargaining position* 25 per- cent found their bargaining 
position lsg>roved, 16 per- cent replied that the laws have not 
affected their bargaining position, and over- 8 per'- cent gave 
no answer.
fhls type of legislation has. had a profound effect on 
labor, union policies.' the role of labor in the production of 
public utility services' is generally very small, that is, it 
takes very few men to produce electricity or gas, for example* 
In the short run* the utilities have found that they are 
entirely independent of organised labor* During some work
-stoppages, .supervisory employees have been able to maintain.
.full service even though all the workers have left their 
poets.
Added to its already minor role in- the productiQn of ' 
th© utility services, labor has been deprived of it© right 
to .strike through anti-strike legislation, this- situation 
ha© served to turn the attention of the labor organisations 
from the traditional economic battles of strikes and bargain­
ing to the featties of politics in an attempt to voice its 
demands. fhe inoreasing role in politics on the part of 
labor in general has grown in the last fee years, political 
■action, is fast becoming the -chief weapon available to enforce 
the workers* demands, particularly the demands of fhe- public 
-utility westers who have been deprived of the ri^ht to strike.
Therefore> public utility labor has been forced to 
turn to politics as the only remaining weapon. Labor has led 
the fight for repeal of this type of legislation in every 
state, tore repeal ha© failed, other political methods arc 
attempted, a© evidence of this fact., one -utility manager 
from Indiana commented:
In our state we have a compulsory arbitration law which was f airly well administered until, the present Democratic -governor campaigned on the repeal of this arbitration law. saying tot If was unfair to organs iced labor. .8* was elected by a very minor majority 
while the state legislature is Republican, fines the laws were not repealed by vote, he made the state­ment that he would make the utilities damned sorry that there was an arbitration law and proceeded to fill all t o  Arbitration Boards with ex-A. F. of L. presidepts. -.In one case toy allowed wage raises to .employees of a bus -company which threw it into 
receivership.
Although this comment is frankly partisan, it does show 
that the political activities of labor are on the increase, 
labor is certainly not the only party that has turned to 
politics as a Beans of gaining advantage. It is probably 
true that management has been active in this* field too. As 
hr. MacDonald so aptly stated, won© inevitable result of 
legislation setting up machinery for settieraent of labor 
disputes is accelerated political pressures which tenet to 
reduce efforts at direct settlement.{t̂
Another effect of this type of legislation on the role 
of labor is an actual financial threat to the existence of 
the local union. Since provision Is Bade for appeal of the 
decisions of the boards, it is not unusual for the dispute 
to be taken to court, fhe expense of a long legal battle is 
an extreme burden on the treasuries of most local labor organ­
isations. Several complaints accompanied the questionnaires 
from labor leaders and labor organisations stating that It 
was potential bankruptcy for the union to pursue Its case 
when appealed to the courts. Not only are the financial 
resources of the union small when compared to those of the 
utility but the utility continues to draw profit from its 
sales while waiting for a decision. In fact, It-might be 
profitable for the utility to appeal the arbitration decision
f " 9 MacSohald, Compulsory Arbitration . . ., op. pit.,
p. 7S.
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when large increases in wages are granted beoauee the profits 
from sales during the legal battle sight be greater than the 
costs of such litigation.
The effect of this type of legislation on the policies 
of the utilities is also potentially great. It would seem 
that company labor polioies could be affected by a prohibition 
of strike. The companies might be less concerned with the 
grievances of the workers since the strike weapon has been 
taken away.
However, where seizure is more than on a token basis, 
there might be some concern on the part of the utilities lest 
their labor policies bring on state operation. State seizure 
and operation probably la not welcomed by the utilities. 
Although seizure does, not impose penalties on utility earnings 
(except in Virginia), it certainly takes away the traditional 
management prerogative of ^running the business as management 
sees fit®.
The cost of advertising utility labor polioies might 
be affooted by the laws. That is, since the threat of strikes 
has been removed, It would be no longer necessary to inform 
the public of the "good deeds® of the utilities toward the 
workers In an effort to gain favorable public opinion.
However, it is also possible that the opposite could be the 
effect. That is, because the power of public opinion may be 
strong in forcing settlements of differences' before or after
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seizure and because of the Increased political activity of 
both parties, the costs of advertising labor policies might 
be increased.
In answer to the questionnaires, over 58 per cent of 
the utilities indicated that the laws had not affected the 
costs of advertising labor policies; In only 8 per cent of 
the replies was an inoreased cost noted. Since over 33 per 
cent gave no answer to this question, it is difficult to 
substantiate the effect of the statutes on this cost item. 
However, it is probable that the statutes had little effect 
in view of the fact that the advertising of labor policy is 
probably a minor cost item for the majority of the utilities.
The assurance of no work stoppages and continued- 
service might have an effect on business confidence in this 
industry. This might lead to inoreased oapital expansion 
caused by the increased stability of Income. However, .since 
there were few interruptions of service before the laws were 
passed, and since income to the utilities has always been 
rather stable, the statutes probably have had little effect 
on business confidence and oapital expansion in the utilities.
The laws might have an effect on rate and pricing 
politioes. The utilities probably find it easier to get 
rate increases from the regulatory commissions when arbi­
tration decisions raise the labor costs. Professor Thomas 
Kennedy of the University of Pennsylvania has noted:
. . . a oompany may prefer to use compulsory arbitration when it is available if it is of the opinion that the granting of what it considers a reasonable and necessary wage raise will necessi­tate an increase in the rates to be paid by the public for its services, fhe company is able to make a much stronger case before the Public Utility Commission for a rate increase if it can show that its costs are higher not because it freely negotiated a certain wage increase but rather because it was forced to give the increase by a compulsory board of arbitration. In present­ing its case for a fare increase before the Public Utility Commission in 1948, the Public Service Transport Company argued that one State body should not deny a fare increase.which was necessitated by a wage increase granted by another body appointed by the State.*0
Labor might feel that the utilities pass on the increased
wages to the customer through inoreased rates and therefore
lose nothing in unfavorable arbitration decisions. However,
when the arbitration decisions are unfavorable to labor, the
unions lose the Inoreased wages and the right to ask for
revisions In the wage levels for the rest of the year or the
rest of the life of the contract. Therefore, the unions
claim the utilities cannot lose by arbitration whereas labor
can lose not only the wage increase, but the opportunity to
bargain for a year.
In so far as appeals to the arbitration decisions are 
taken into oourt by the utilities# the laws might increase 
Hie cost of litigation for the utilities. That is, since
10 Thomas Kennedy, «The Handling of Emergency Disputes, 
a paper presented before the Joint meeting of the Industrial Relatione Board Association and the Political Science Association, Hew York City# 1949.
appeals usually go through a long and costly court battle 
regardless of which party originates this action, there is 
an additional expense on the oompany. However, as pointed 
out above, it is possible that the utility oould make an 
actual profit by taking the arbitration decisions to the 
courts sines fhe cost of litigation might be less than the 
increased Wages paid to the workers.
This type of legislation might affect public policy. 
The public utility concept, as outlined in Chapter 11, is 
purely a legal concept. In so far as this legal concept is 
based on the natural monopoly poeition of public utilities 
and the essential nature of tide services of utilities, these 
laws might serve to reinforce the public utility concept. 
They certainly point up the essentiality of public utility 
service and emphasize the “natural monopoly” position of 
these Industries.
In so far as the concept of "natural monopoly" is 
based on high fixed costs and increasing returns, the laws 
might give emphasis to this concept, fhers might be a 
tendency for the laws to stabilise the costs of labor and 
thus tend to make labor costs into at least short term (one 
year) fixed costs. By making the labor costs more or less 
fixed, this in turn gives additional emphasis to the increas­
ing returns of the utilities. The greater the fixed costs, 
the more the principle of increasing returns applies.
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• Strides have often been considered .aft “Acts of Qod* 
by regulatory commissions. That to, above and beyond the 
control of the utility and therefor# not a responsibility of 
the utility, These laws certainly tend to Increase this ©on- 
cept in so far as they tahe away* even more so than in the 
past* the responsibility of the utility for worh stoppages.
In the absolute sense* the amount of regulation of 
the utilities is increased by the statutes. The acts attempt 
to settle labor disputes and in so doing impose even more 
regulation on the utilities than previously fcnown. In 
addition, it has been proposed by one writer and in one state 
that the regulatory commissions administer the laws since they 
are the best informed as to Hie condition of the Industry*!! 
Should this come about, the amount of regulation would be 
further increased.
The statutes probably have the effect of increasing 
Hi© amount of future regulation as well. Should labor 
relation regulation prove successful, It might be a starting 
place for future regulation in areas still left beyond the 
control of the law at present.
It is possible that this type of legislative approach 
might further the public ownership movement in the utility
it Rosbbe Ames, » should State Commissions Regulate 
Utility Labor Relations?^ Public Utilities Fortnightly, 30:556-6, March IS, 1947, ■ and*Maryla«d Anti-Strike Law proposed*6 Public Utilities Fortnightly, 45:320, March 6*1950 . .
field. Sim© the statute© cause additional regulation and 
control of the utilities# they give additional emphasis to 
the -idea -that utilities are,' as- creatures of the state.., really 
a part of the state. Hie conclusion from this Is that they 
should be in fact as part of the state government. As far 
as this reasoning holds true, these lavs would further the 
public ownership movement.
In addition, should the statutes fall to cope with 
the problem of continued service, public ownership might 
result as the alternative method of providing oontlaaed 
service.
tt the laws will have this effect, the utilities 
themselves do not see this threat to their position, la 
answering the questionnaire, 75 per cent of the utilities 
were of the opinion that the laws have not affected the 
question of public ownership, fhe remaining 25 per cent did 
not give opinions,
fhe general effect oft future public regulation could 
be that* if successful, this type of approach to labor prob­
lems might be attempted in other industries, therefore, the 
statutes might have the effect of sponsoring future legis­
lation. fhe opposite could also be true. Should the laws 
fail to do the 4ob that they were designed to do, they might 
have the effect of causing ^andonment of this type of 
approach to the problem in general and compulsory arbitration
in particular. The whole question of the worth of compul­
sory arbitration could be answered in the experience of 
these statutes*
CHAPTER VIII 
EVALUATION OP ANTX-STRIKE LEGISLATION
In attempting to evaluate this type of legislation, 
certain weaknesses or flaws appear that seem to detract from 
the effectiveness of the anti-strike laws as a means of 
settling labor disputes. A large group of these weaknesses 
appear in the laws themselves. That is, certain things are 
missing from the statutes or the statutes are worded in such 
a way as to detract from their effectiveness.
The very basis of the legislation has been challenged 
In its definition of a ‘‘public emergency*. Because super­
visory employees have always prevented a complete servloe 
stoppage, even In the long Duquesne power strike, Professor 
Thomas Kennedy, University of Pennsylvania# seriously doubts 
that a "public emergency*, as defined by the law, has ever 
existed.^
According to professor Kennedy, at no time during any 
of the so-called “public emergencies" was the service stopped 
completely and therefore he states that the health and wel­
fare of the people were never threatened. As evidence that 
there was no actual stoppage of service and thus no public
1 Thomas Kennedy, “The Handling of Emergency Disputes,* a paper presented before the Joint meeting of the Industrial Relations Board Association and the Political Science Association, New York City, 1949.
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emergency during the legally contested phone strike In New 
Jersey In 1947, Kennedy notes:
Both the Company and the Union have agreed that the following statement Is correct: "The strikehad the following effect on telephone service: dialservice was relatively unaffected; emergency calls were completed; In communities where dial servioe was not furnished, the service was approximately 20 per oent of normal; Interstate servioe was curtailed to about 40 per cent of normal.*2
Kennedy, upon further analysis of the strikes In gas and
transportation plants in New Jersey, oonoludes that a public
emergency has never actually existed under the New Jersey
statute.3
Further question arises from the fact that 
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania do not consider that stoppages 
in telephone and transportation services are emergencies 
under the law. According to Kennedy, citing the Sllchter 
report, there is serious doubt that the interruption of 
these services jeopardise the public health and public 
safety.4
It does seem inconsistent that one state considers
2 Kennedy, *The Handling . . ., op. olt., citing 
Brief on Behalf of the Defendant, New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, in The State of New Jersey v. Traffic Telephone Workers Federation of Hew" Jersey, etT ai., in cHianbery of Mew "Jersey 1 W 3 7 7 ------------ ---------
3 Op. clt.
4 0£. clt., citing Slichter, Sumner H., Report of the Governor * e Xabor-Management Committee, (House NoT 11375).
work stoppages in telephone and transportation services as 
emergencies Pereas another adjoining state feels that these 
do not jeopardize the public safety.
Another weakness of the laws is the lack of adequate 
penalties on management. the laws take from labor the right 
to strike and forbid the utilities from ^locking out" their 
employees, fhe lockout has been used infrequently la the 
utilities because of the responsibility' of management to 
provide continuous service* under regulation of the law. the 
utilities, unlike the unions, therefore, are not losing a 
major weapon of economic warfare.
therefore, since it Is the unions that would probably 
cause work stoppages, the fines and penalties are aimed 
directly at them, there are no fines against management for 
refusal to bargain or for inciting strikes by various means.
It would be possible for the utilities to manipulate their 
labor policies in such a way a© to cause discontent and 
grievances without concern about possible strikes. Should 
strikes or work stoppages occur, the utility Is protected by 
the law and the unions are broken, physically or financially, 
by the statutes and court battles. In addition, the utilities 
continue to make profits from continued operation®, even 
under seizure:.
fbe wage criteria that the laws set up for the arbi­
trators to follow in making decisions could be questioned.
Because of the Xaoh of adequate guides for the arbitrators, 
the decisions of the. boards are prone to- be made on a basis- . 
of compromise.
'Most of the laws do hare some .standards. Generally, 
-these standards set the guide' of comparability for the arbi- - 
trators to follow. However, if new wages and hours are to 
be set- on the basis -of comparable- wages and hours in the 
industry, it could be possible that the wage level would 
remain low throughout the entire industry. Because the 
arbitration decisions are based on comparable wage rates* 
wages wight all rise to the point of the highest wages at 
the - time of the passage of the laws and no higher, with no 
regard to such things as cost of living or Improvement in 
real wages. Inaddition, where broad standards are laid 
down, such at the amended New Jersey act,, there is no indi­
cation of the weight to be given each standard, further;, no 
definition it given to the meaning of such phrases as "the 
interest and welfare of the public* in the New .Jersey 1 aw or 
"value of service to the consumer* in the Wisconsin law.5
likewise, 'there are -no standards to be followed by 
the arbitration board in Massachusetts. Although arbitration 
under this act is voluntary on the. ̂ request* of the Governor, 
the board is of state origin, being appointed by the Governor,
5 See pp. 79 f. for lew Jersey standards and. p. -Si 
for Wisconsin and standards of other states having compulsory 
arbitration decisions..
ana the board does have the power to aetwagea add working 
conditions.6
fhe above weakness applies generally to that group of 
laws that call for compulsory arbitration and in some cases# 
snob as the Massachusetts act# to the other group that 
relies on seizure. However, this does not mean that the 
seizure group does not also have weaknesses.
.. Within the. seizure groups' (characterized as the #Hew' 
Jersey pattern* in ShapterV) the statutes of Hew Jersey and 
Missouri which incorporate compulsory arbitration am well as 
seizure are open to the above criticism also.
One outstanding weakness of the seizure groups is the 
failure to provide any means of settling the dispute after 
seizure has taken place. In Hew Jersey, provision for settle­
ment after seizure was added in an amendment after the lack 
became apparent. However, as yet, none of the other states 
have seen fit to add any procedure for settlement past the 
point of seizure. After seizure it would be possible for 
either side to prolong the state operation indefinitely by
i
refusing to settle fhe dispute. In this respect, the 
Missouri, Massachusetts and Virginia laws seem weak.
fhe possibility of prolonged seizure points out 
another possible weakness of the statu tee. luring a period 
of lowering price levels, it would be possible for the unions
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to oause seizure by failure to agree to a settlement and 
thereby preserve their present wage level. During seizure, 
the laws provide that no change In pay or working conditions 
will be made by the state and that the workers have the 
right to their Jobs under state employment. Therefore, the 
workers in a period of falling prices and wages would be 
guaranteed their Jobs and their wages at the conditions pre­
vailing at the beginning of the seizure for an Indefinite 
period since there is no compulsion to end seizure. Since 
the laws have been in operation in a period of rising prices, 
this use of seizure has not yet occurred. However, it seems 
to be a definite weakness should the laws be operative in a 
period of falling prices.
Another weakness of seizure is the indefiniteness of 
the laws about the financial aspects of plant operation 
during seizure. Only the Virginia law states that the 
Governor will take complete charge of affairs, even to super­
vising the payment of wages and collection of revenues. The
other states provide that the Governor or his agent * shall
• * ► take possession for the use and operation for the state® and
the Governor may “prescribe the neoessary rules and regula­
tions® to carry out operation of the seized utility. This 
seems to put the state government in complete oharge of the 
affairs of the utility during seizure.
If the state has complete oharge, the question arises
11?
as to the state1s policy should a utility that 1b losing 
money be seized. There is no provision in any of the laws, 
for appropriations from state funds to keep the utility 
running and the customer served, yet, continued servioe 
being the object of seizure, it would seem that the state 
government would have to provide funds from some source to 
keep the labor employed and pay the expenses of operation 
should the state seise a utility that is not collecting 
enough revenue to meet its expenses. If the state govern­
ment only seized profitable utilities, the intent of the law 
would not be fulfilled.
Since the state government would bo forced to seize 
a utility regardless of its finanoial condition, a convenient 
method would be provided for management to retain their Jobs 
and stay in business during a business depression. The 
moment a utility began to lose money and/or was refused rate 
Increases by the regulatory commission, management could 
cause a work stoppage forcing state seizure. Th© seizure 
would force the state to employ and pay the workers and pro­
vide the utility with a method of staying in operation during 
the lull in business. The New Jersey act whloh foroes 
settlement after seizure, of oourse, avoids this possibility.
The Virginia statute is the only aot which omits the 
right of th© individual to quit his Job. Since strikes are 
permitted, this right has been left out. However, this
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appears to be a weakness.
After the workers have been polled under the Virginia 
law and assuming they have gone to work for the state# there 
would be no right to quit the job for deployment elsewhere. 
This would constitute a type of involuntary servitude for It 
would mean that the state could force the workers# onoe they 
have agreed to stay on to work for the state# to remain at 
their posts regardless of individual preference.
Further, the guarantee of the right of the Individual 
to quit his job seems basic to the individual*s freedom. 
Although the Virginia aot has not been tested in the oourts# 
Involuntary servitude has been a leading question in the 
test cases elsewhere.7 It is possible that the Virginia law 
might be unconstitutional because of its lack of a guarantee 
of this basic right of the individual.
In addition to the weaknesses of the laws themselves# 
there are several weaknesses that appear in the application 
of the statutes.
As noted in Chapter VII# the laws have tended to 
become a political question. The laws were designed to pro­
vide continued service to the consumers# not to be a campaign 
issue or a "political football*. The possibility of politics 
and the use of the laws for political advantage is unfortunate.
V dee p. 78, point #1 union brief filed in State V. Traffic Telephone Workers Federation of Hew Jersey. ~
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Perhaps this Is a natural consequence of attempting to deal 
with labor relations through state legislation. Nevertheless, 
It seems to be a weakness of the application of the laws for 
they were designed to cope with a definite eoonomio problem 
and have Instead beoome a political problem.
Another weakness in the application of the laws is 
the tendency to fail to protect the oonsumer. Labor is given 
a chance to plead their case before an arbitration board and 
many of the rights of labor, suoh as the right to bargain 
and to quit their Jobs, are specifically guaranteed. She 
utilities are protected in their rights to bargaining and 
through the »wiseH presentation of arbitration decisions, 
the utilities are able to get rate increases in an easier 
manner from the regulatory commissions. However, nowhere in 
the statutes have the rights of the oonsumer been considered.
Labor asks and may receive wage inoreases. These 
wage inoreases are taken before the regulatory commissions 
and rate increases may be granted to the utilities. There­
fore, the demands of labor may be satisfied and the rate of 
return may be maintained for the utilities. It is only the 
unfortunate consumer who is caught in the middle and forced, 
not only to put up with servioe stoppages should they come 
about in the process of the settlement of the dispute, but 
to pay higher bills as well. Although the regulatory 
commissions are undoubtedly attempting to protect the
120
consuming public, it la unlikely that they would refuse rate 
Increases when the utilities have been forced to give.wage 
increases by compulsory arbitrations, a matter over which 
the commissions have no control, therefore, it Is the 
oonsumer of the utility servioe who directly or indirectly 
pays the bill.
It is regrettable that the laws are based, to some 
extent, on the prinolple of compulsion. It seems unfortunate 
that we are not able to find some other method of solving 
labor disputes without having to force Individuals to perform 
acts under the threat of compulsion. This reflects the basio 
weakness that the laws, not looking to the underlying causes 
of labor disputes, take the short run method of forcing 
settlement on the parties in disagreement. The laws do not 
seem to be designed to find and correct the basic causes of 
labor difficulties. Rather, they seem to be designed with 
the idea of continuing the servioe to the consumer regardless 
of the long run effects of such a policy of compulsion or the 
failure to find the basic causes of disputes.
perhaps it Is too soon to make an evaluation of this 
legislation. Borne of the statutes, the Hew Jersey act for 
example, have been changed and are in the process of change. 
Therefore, any generalisation must consider the over-all 
legislation and not the particular statute. Further, the 
laws have been operative but a short period and the experience
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The articles In Time, U. S. Hews and Business Week are in the nature of short”reports on the news of utility strikes as they occurred. These are useful only as information about the progress and background of the labor difficulties. Friedman's article in the George Washington Law Review provides an excellent background
this legislation. The article in Fortune gives an excellent background of the conditions prior to anti-strike legislation. The majority of the articles in the Publio Utilities Fortnightly are cf the nature of reports and give valuable background material. The articles by Hassett
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and Jones are useful surveys of the anti-strike legis­lation at that date, The artioles by Governor Edge# Julian and Kilpatrick are studies of the application of the statutes in New Jersey# Missouri and Virginia, they provide excellent background and useful statistics. Mr. Hill*s editorial in, the Electrical World was a leading faotor in bringing forth compulsory arbitration and Is good. The alternative proposals by Ames# Bowen# Dorau and McIntosh give indication of the reaction to publio utility work stoppages. Generally, they are good. Vogel's article on the rights of public employees Is useful in pointing out the legal aspects of bargaining.
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Although the oases are generally concerned with the 
legal right to strike, they present good material as to the application of the statutes. The Traffic Telephone dispute series was very valuable in pointing up the 
effects of the legislation.
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D. STATUTES
Acts of Assembly (Virginia), 1946, e. 39.
Acts of Assembly (Virginia), 1947, c. 9.
Labor Management Relations Aot, 29 U8GA 141,
Laws of Florida, 1947, (H.B..954), c. 23911.
Laws of Indiana, 1947, ©. 341.
Laws of Kansas, 1920, c. 29.
Laws of Massachusetts, 1947, c. 596.
Laws of Missouri, 1947, H.B. 180.
Laws of Nebraska, 1947, c. 178, (L.B. 537).
Laws of New Jersey, 1946, c. 38.
Laws of New Jersey, 1947, o. 47, c. 75.
Laws of New Jersey, 1949. e. 308.
Laws of Pennsylvania, 1947, c. 485, (S.B. 801).
Laws of Wisconsin, 1947, o. 414, (S.B. 91).
Publio Aot No. 176, (Michigan), Laws of 1939 as amended Laws of 1947, S.B. 264.
The statutes, all somewhat similar, are valuable as primary material.
E. REPORTS
Kennedy, Thomas, “The Handling of Emergency Disputes,0 a paper presented before the Joint meeting of the Indus­trial Relations Board Association and the P0lltloal Science Association, New York City, 1949.
Report of Special Committee on Labor Legislation In Publio Utility Field, 1946-1947, presented at annual meeting, September 22-23, 1947, Cleveland, Ohio, American Bar Association.
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Kennedy is especially helpful and very good. The Bar . 
Association report is concerned with the legal aspects of the right to strike but does have good background material.
F. NEWSPAPERS
"First Test of Utilities Act," Richmond News Leader,
May 22, 1947.
This editorial gives some idea of the reaction to the use of anti-strike legislation.
APPENDIX
130:
CPESTlGHHAlRE - LABOR OROA^lZAflOH
(Pleas© check one In each classification)
1 . oenenal opinicn of statutes06.6# S&tisfaotopy 
93.3# Unsatisfactory Ho opinion
2. Beneficial (in regard,to wages* hoars and working conditions)
06.6# They have benefited us greatly in regard to wages* hours and working oonditions 
06.6% They have henefited us at times in regard to wages* hours and working oonditions 
73.3% They have Benefited we rarely In regard to wages* hours and working oonditions 
13.3% Ho answer
3. Union strength (membership)
06.6% The laws have improved our relative strength (increased our membership)
20.2% The laws have been detrimental to our relative strength (decreased membership )
46.6% The laws have not affected our relative strength (constant membership)
26.6% Ho answer' •
4. Arbitration decisions
06 .6% The results of the arbitration decisions have ■ generally been favorable to labor 
53.5# The.results of the arbitration decisions have generally been unfavorable to labor 
20.0% The results of the arbitration decisions havegenerally been neither favorable nor unfaborable to labor 
20.0% Ho answer
5. Relations with companies .(employers)06 Our relations with the employers have been Improved 
by these law# ,
73.3% Our relations with the employers have been worsened by these laws
20. M  ^  relations with the employers have not been affected by these laws
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6. Bargaining position
06,6% The laws have improved our general bargaining position 
80,Off The laws have been detrimental to our general bargain­ing position
13,5# The laws have not affected our general bargaining position
?. Pines46.6# The fines imposed by the laws are too severe ______ The fines imposed by the laws are Inadequate. The fines imposed by the laws are adequate 
53.3# No answer, (Have the fines ever been imposed on you? yes 100# no)
8. (In states requiring compulsory arbitration) Compulsory arbitration53.3# The compulsory arbitration provisions are too severe 06.6# The compulsory arbitration provisions are insufficient 
13.3# The compulsory arbitration provisions are adequate 
46.6# No answer
9. (In states with seizure provisions) Seizure40.2# The seizure provisions of the laws are too severe 66.6# The seizure provisions of the laws are insufficient 
06.6# The seizure provisions of the laws are adequate 46.6% No answer
10. Approach to the problem of continued service06.6# This type of law is the best approach to the problem15.3# Government ownership is the best approaoh to the
problem13.3# Regulation by existing regulatory bodies is the best approaoh to the problem 
66.6# No regulation at all is the best approach to the problem
Your comments on any or all of the above opinions or answers would be welcomed and appreciated.
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QUESTIONNAIRE - MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION
(Please oheok one in eaoh classification)
1. General opinion of statutes 50.0% Satisfactory50.0% Unsatisfactory 
  No opinion
2. Beneficial08.5% They have benefited us greatly58.5% They have benefited us rarely55.3% They have benefited us at times
3. Arbitration decisions08.5% ©is results of the arbitration deoialone have generally been favorable to management 
41.6% The results of the arbitration decisions have generally been unfavorable to management 55.3% The results of the arbitration decisions havegenerally been neither favorable nor unfavorable to management
4. Wage increases41.6% Arbitration deoislons have tended to increase wages without Justification  Arbitration decisions have tended to hold back wageswithout Justification 
35.5% Arbitration deoislons have had no effeot on wages 
25.0% No answer
5. Relations with employees16.6% Our relations with employees have been improved by the laws25.0% Our relations with employees have been worsened by the laws60.0% Our relations with employees have not been affected by the laws 
08.5% No answer
6. Bargaining position25.0% The laws have improved our bargaining position 50.0% The laws have been detrimental to our bargaining position16.6% The laws have not affeoted our bargaining position <08.3% No answer
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7. Costs of advertising labor policy
08,3# The laws have Increased the costs of advertising our labor policy
  The laws have decreased the costs of advertisingour labor policy 
58.3# The laws have not affected the costs of advertising our labor policy 53.3# Ho answer
8. Fines
.____  The fines imposed by the laws are too severe^ __ The. fines imposed by the laws are insufficient35751? The fines imposed by the laws are adequate &r.6% Ho answer
(Have fines ever been imposed on you? yes 100# no)
9. (In states requiring compulsory arbitration) Compulsory arbitration16.6# The compulsory arbitration provisions are too severe '16.6% The compulsory arbitration provisions are insufficient 33.3% The compulsory arbitration provisions are adequate33.3% , No answer
\
10. (In states with seizure provisions) Seizure 08.5# The seizure provisions are too severeThe seizure provisions are insufficient35.5# The seizure provisions are adequate
58.3% No answer
11. Move towards public ownershipThe laws have tended to move public utilities toward publio ownership
The laws have tended to prevent movement toward public ownership 
75.0# The laws have not affected the question of publio ownership 
£5.0# No answer
12. Approach to the problem of continued service66.6# "This type of law is the best approach to the problem Government ownership is the best approach to the  ------ problem16.6# Regulation by existing regulatory bodies is the best approaoh to the problem 08.3# No regulation at all is the beet approach to the problem 08.3# No answer
Your comment on any or all of the above opinions or answers would be welcomed and appreciated.
